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ABSTRACT 
 
 The FCC is now engaged in resolving whether to require cable system operators 
who provide cable modem service to residential users to furnish cable transmission 
capacity to unaffiliated Internet Service Providers.  To resolve this controversy, the FCC 
has expressed a desire to develop an analytical approach that is, to the extent possible, 
consistent across multiple platforms.  This comment may have been intended to 
specifically highlight the fact that DSL service is currently subject to a panoply of access 
and unbundling requirements that do not now apply to cable modem service.  However, it 
can also be read more broadly to suggest that in a world of increasing technological 
convergence and increasing intermodal competition, a more universally consistent 
analytical approach is needed to resolve the many analogous disputes over competitive 
access to proprietary bottleneck facilities that arise in a broad range of communications 
contexts.   
 
  The issues raised by the current dispute over cable open access are substantially 
analogous to those raised in the longstanding dispute over direct access to the 
INTELSAT satellite system.  That dispute was resolved in 1999, when the FCC authorized 
unaffiliated competitors to obtain direct access to INTELSAT, on the grounds that such a 
policy would :  (1) encourage the widest possible deployment of communications 
facilities; (2) encourage competition among providers of communications service; and (3) 
benefit consumers by facilitating lower prices and more diverse service offerings.  Each 
of these arguments have been raised by proponents of cable open access.  In fact, without 
exception, these criteria each support the implementation of cable open access today at 
least as strongly as they supported the implementation of direct access to INTELSAT in 
1999.  Accordingly, implementation of cable open access would be analytically 
consistent with the implementation of direct access to INTELSAT.  Conversely, an FCC  
decision not to implement cable open access would be analytically inconsistent (indeed, 
irreconcilable) its decision to impose INTELSAT direct access decision.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 Almost as soon as high-speed Internet access became available to residential users 
via cable modem in 1998, a controversy erupted over whether the cable system operators 
who owned the HFC cables used to provide such access should be required by law to 
furnish cable transmission capacity to unaffiliated Internet Service Providers (ISPs).1  
Proponents of such a regulatory requirement refer to it as cable open access, and assert 
that  is needed in order to create or maintain conditions of competition in the residential 
ISP market.2  Opponents, in contrast have asserted that such forced access would be 
unfair to incumbent cable operators, and would discourage future investment in the 
continued deployment of last mile cable facilities that connect residential users to the 
Internet.3 
                                                 
1  See Jim Chen, The Authority To Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 
16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 677, 677 (2001) (The regulation of cable- based platforms for 
high-speed access to the Internet has become the most controversial subject in 
communications law.).  Cf. James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open 
Access, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975, 980 (2000) (the cable open access issue seems to 
have been placed into public debate, if not to have been first born, upon the 
announcement of the AT&T/TCI merger [in 1998]). 
2  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925 
(2001); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 Whittier 
L. Rev. 3 (2000).  See also Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, & Hal J. Singer, 
Residential Demand For Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access To 
Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 Yale J. On Reg. 129, 170-71 (2001) (To 
remedy the risks of conduit and content discrimination, regulators should subject any 
pending mergers to an open access provision.); Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open 
Access Debate: The Case for a Wholesale Market, 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 653, 655 (2000) 
(arguing that not just ISPs, but also telecommunications service providers, should enjoy a 
right of open access to residential cable transmission capacity); Marcus Maher, 
Comment, Cable Internet Unbundling: Local Leadership In the Deployment of High-
Speed Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 211, 221-23 (1999).  See generally Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, ¶ 27 (2000) (defining 
cable open access and summarizing arguments for and against requiring it). 
3  See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer 
Welfare:  Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling, 52 Hastings L.J. 891 (2001); 
Julian Epstein, A Lite Touch On Broadband: Achieving the Optimal Regulatory 
Efficiency in the Internet Broadband Market, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 37 (2001); James B. 
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 39 (2000).  The phrase last mile is a term of 
art that refers to the communications links and related hardware that connect the 
premises with the rest of a telecommunications network, most notably between the home 
(continued . . . ) 
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 Initially, much of the cable open access controversy revolved around the 
threshold question of whether existing law already required (or prohibited) such access.4  
On March 15, 2002, however, the Federal Communications Commission substantially 
resolved this threshold question, by formally classifying the provision of  high-speed 
Internet access to residential users via cable modems as an information service, and not 
as a cable service or a telecommunications service.5  By choosing to classify cable 
modem services as information services, the FCC maximized its own continuing 
                                                                                                                                                 
or small business and the set of interlinked data networks that make up the Internet.  
Committee on Broadband Last Mile Technology, Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, Broadband: Bringing Home the 
Bits 5 (2002); see also id. at 45 (The link between the [Internet] point of presence and 
the customerusing either existing communications infrastructure or new facilitiesis 
frequently referred to as the last mile because it represents a bottleneck that constrains 
the benefits that the consumer gets from the rest of a network, which is literally at some 
distance.).  In the context of residential cable modem service, the last mile facility is 
the hybrid fiber-coax (HFC) cable that delivers access to the Internet into the users 
home.  In the same context, a facilities-based provider is a provider that uses its own 
proprietary last mile facilities to deliver high-speed Internet access to users.  
4  See generally Jim Chen, The Authority To Regulate Broadband Internet Access 
Over Cable, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 677, 704, 712 (2001) (concluding that state and 
local authorities [are barred] from demanding open access, but that the FCC may issue 
an open access rule for cable broadband platforms under any of several general grants of 
rulemaking power); See also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible In 
High Tech Markets? An Inquiry Into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Broadband 
Regulation As Applied To The New Economy, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 41, 82-86 
(2001) (discussing FCCs authority to impose cable open access requirements); Barbara 
S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where The Global 
Information Superhighway Meets The Local Right-Of-Way, 10 CommLaw Conspectus 23 
(2001) (same); Christopher E. Duffy, Note, The Statutory Classification of Cable-
Delivered Internet Service, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1251, 1262 (2000).  Cf. Raymond Shih 
Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 
Tul. L. Rev. 87 (2000) (concluding that mandatory open access requirements would be 
unconstitutional). 
5  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 7 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (Cable Modem Order & NPRM) (holding that 
cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate 
information service, not as a cable service, and [it involves]  . . . no separate offering of 
telecommunications service.), petitions for review pending sub nom., EarthLink, Inc. v. 
FCC, Docket No. 02-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 26, 1997). 
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discretion to adoptor not to adoptcable open access requirements.6  To facilitate its 
exercise of this discretion, the FCC simultaneously launched a new rulemaking 
proceeding to consider the merits of whether it is necessary or appropriate at this time to 
require that cable operators provide unaffiliated ISPs with the right to access cable 
modem service customers directly. . . .7 
 
 At present, wireline telephone local exchange carriers (LECs) who provide 
residential high-speed Internet services via Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) are subject 
to access and unbundling requirements that do not apply to cable operators who provide 
fungible services.8  Accordingly, in arguing for (or against) cable open access, 
commentators have frequently drawn analogies (or distinctions) between residential high-
speed cable modem service and residential high-speed DSL service.9  Cognizant of such 
                                                 
6  See Part V.B, infra (discussing regulatory consequences of classification 
of cable modem services as information services).  Of course, the FCCs classification 
of cable modem services as information services cannot provide the agency with 
authority to implement cable open access if open access is unconstitutional, as some have 
alleged.  Cf. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A 
First Amendment Catch-22, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 87 (2000) (asserting that mandatory open 
access requirements would be unconstitutional). 
7  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 72 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002), petitions for review pending sub nom., 
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, Docket No. 02-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 26, 1997).  In this new 
rulemaking proceeding, the Commission continued to solicit commentary concerning the 
Commissions legal authority to implement cable open access.  See id. ¶¶ 72, 79 
(soliciting further comment on the scope of the FCCs statutory authority to implement 
direct access); id. ¶¶ 80-82 (soliciting comment on possible constitutional limitations on 
the FCCs authority to implement direct access).  The Commission also made clear, 
however, that it is now ready to consider the substantive merits of implementing such a 
policy See id. ¶ 73 (setting forth substantive considerations which the FCC seeks 
comment on). 
8  See notes __, infra; see also In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed 
Access to Internet, Notice of Inquiry, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, ¶ 43 (2000) (as common 
carriers, most wireline LECs must allow ISPs to purchase basic transmission services on 
a nondiscriminatory basis.  As a result, end users are typically given a choice of ISPs, 
which could be accessed over the telephone network. Cable operators . . . do not currently 
operate pursuant to rules requiring end user ISP choice.).   For a review of the historical 
roots of the present divergence between the regulatory paradigms now applied to DSL and 
cable modem service, see Rosemary Harold, Cable-Based Internet Access: Exorcising 
the Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev 721 (2001).  
9  See generally, e.g., Comments of SBC Corp. and BellSouth Corp filed in FCC 
GEN Docket No. 00-185 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (arguing that because cable modems and 
(continued . . . ) 
 4 
 
analogies, the FCC has now resolved to address whether it is appropriate for cable and 
DSL Internet access to continue to be subject to substantially dissimilar regulatory 
regimes.10  
 
 When it framed this question, the Commission stated that it will strive to develop 
an analytical approach that is, to the extent possible, consistent across multiple 
platforms.11  At a minimum, the Commission has thus identified the establishment of 
regulatory parity between cable modem and DSL service as a desirable policy objective, 
albeit one that might not necessarily trump other policy objectives or statutory constraints.  
More generally, however, the Commissions statement might reflect a broader desire to 
establish a more consistent analytical approach to resolving the disputes over competitive 
                                                                                                                                                 
DSL lines provide fungible high-speed Internet access services to residential users, the 
two technologies should be subject to the same regulatory requirements).  Cf. James B. 
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 39, 42 (2000) (On one end of the spectrum, 
incumbent local telephone companies are currently subject not only to a significant 
remnant of traditional public utility regulation, but also the new interconnection, 
unbundling, and cooperation duties imposed by the 1996 [Telecommunications] Act.  . . .  
At the other end, access providers that do not use any of the existing telephone plant 
(such as . . . cable television companies . . .) may not be required even to interconnect 
their facilities with those of other networks.). 
10  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 6 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) ([I]n this proceeding, as well as in a related 
proceeding concerning broadband access to the Internet over domestic wireline facilities, 
we seek to create a rational framework for the regulation of competing services that are 
provided via different technologies and network architectures.  We recognize that 
residential high-speed access to the Internet is evolving over multiple electronic 
platforms, including wireline, cable, terrestrial wireless and satellite.) (footnote omitted), 
petitions for review pending sub nom., EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, Docket No. 02-1097 (D.C. 
Cir. filed Mar. 26, 1997).  The related proceeding concerning broadband access to the 
Internet over domestic wireline facilities referred to in the Cable Modem Order & 
NPRM proposes to classify high-speed residential DSL service as an information 
service subject to substantially similar regulatory requirements as cable modem service.  
See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 02-42, CC Docket No. 02-33, 2002 WL 252714 (Wireline Broadband 
NPRM) (rel. Feb. 15, 2002), reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 9232 (Feb. 28, 2002). 
11  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 73 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002), petitions for review pending sub nom., 
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, Docket No. 02-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 26, 1997).  
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access to proprietary bottleneck facilities which recur in a broad range of communications 
contexts.   If so, then the FCC might wish to consider harmonizing its analytical approach 
to the cable open access debate not only with its analytical approach to DSL access 
requirements, but also with the approach that it recently employed to resolve another 
longstanding dispute which also concerned competitors demands for a right of 
unbundled access to separate components of proprietary communications facilities.  
 
 Specifically, in 1999, the FCC adopted a rule entitling unaffiliated international 
telecommunications carriers and users to obtain direct access at wholesale rates to the 
raw satellite transmission capacity of the INTELSAT satellite system, without being 
required to purchase any additional bundled communications services from 
INTELSATs U.S. affiliate, COMSAT.12  In authorizing direct access to INTELSAT, 
the FCC confronted and resolved several issues of law and policy that are analytically 
analogous to those raised by the current dispute over whether unaffiliated ISPs should be 
entitled to obtain open access at wholesale rates to the raw cable transmission capacity 
that is used to provide retail residential high-speed Internet service. As discussed herein, 
the Commissions decision to implement direct access to INTELSAT was predicated on 
its findings that adopting such a rule would :  (1) encourage the widest possible 
deployment of communications facilities; (2) encourage competition among providers of 
communications service; (3) maintain regulatory neutrality among competing 
technologies that provide similar services; and (4) remove regulation where the public 
interest is served by that action.13  These are substantially the same policy benefits that 
proponents claim would derive from a rule authorizing cable open access rule.14  
Accordingly, this Paper contends that the FCCs stated goal of harmonization of analytical 
                                                 
12  See Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd. 15703 (1999).  
INTELSAT is a 143-member intergovernmental organization created by international 
agreement. In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 5 (2000), recon. denied, 15 
FCC Rcd. 28234 (2000) (citing Agreement Relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization INTELSAT, done Feb. 12, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 
3813 (INTELSAT Agreement) and Operating Agreement Relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization, INTELSAT, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 
U.S.T. 4091 (INTELSAT Operating Agreement)).  Until 2001, the INTELSAT treaty 
organization owned and operated a global fleet of geostationary commercial 
communications satellites over which much of the world's international telephone, video, 
data, Internet, and other communications were transmitted.  Id. ¶¶ 5-7.  On July 18, 2001, 
INTELSATs business operations were privatized into a corporate holding company 
structure.  Intelsat L.L.C., 16 FCC Rcd. 18185, ¶ 1 (2001).   Today, INTELSATs 
former satellite fleet is operated by Intelsat Ltd., a Delaware corporation that is a 
subsidiary within that privatized structure and the U.S. licensee for operation of existing 
and planned satellites in the C-band and Ku- band.  Id.  For more on INTELSAT, see 
Subparts II.B, III.B, and V.A, infra. 
13  See Subpart VI, supra. 
14  See id. 
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approach would militate in favor of implementing cable open access or, alternatively, 
possibly repealing the rule requiring direct access to INTELSAT.15 
 
 Part II of this Paper describes the parallel development in the 1960s of cable 
television and international satellite telecommunications, both of which developed under 
conditions of regulated natural monopoly.  Part III describes the onset in the 1980s of 
competition against the incumbents in both industries, and the regulatory readjustments 
that were made to foster or to accommodate such competition.  Part IV describes the rise 
of residential Internet access and the separate regulatory frameworks that characterize the 
low-speed and high-speed residential ISP markets.   Part V recounts the issues raised in 
the separate debates over cable open access and INTELSAT direct access.  On an 
issue-by-issue basis, Part VI compares the merits of the case for cable open access with 
those of the case for INTELSAT direct access.  Without exception, this Paper 
concludes that the stated criteria underlying the FCCs decision to implement direct 
access to INTELSAT in 1999 each would provide at least as strong a basis for 
implementing cable open access today.  Accordingly, implementation of cable open 
access would be analytically consistent with the Commissions stated reasons for 
implementing direct access to INTELSAT.  Conversely, an FCC  decision not to 
implement cable open access would be analytically inconsistent (indeed, irreconcilable) 
with the INTELSAT direct access decision.  
 
II. Cable TV and INTELSAT Satellites:  The Monopoly Years. 
 In the 1960s, America witnessed the rise of two new means of communicating 
information:  cable television and geostationary international telecommunications satellites 
(GEOs or satellites).16   In certain respects, the business and legal arrangements that 
                                                 
15  On first glance, the FCC might appear to now lack authority to repeal its rule 
requiring direct access to INTELSAT.  In 1999, the FCC implemented direct access to 
INTELSAT in a rulemaking proceeding.  Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, 14 
FCC Rcd. 15703 (1999).  Six months later, however, Congress codified the FCCs direct 
access rule, seemingly immunizing the rule against FCC repeal.  See 47 U.S.C. § 765(a) 
(enacted Mar. 17, 2000).  In July 2001, however, as discussed at note __, supra, 
INTELSATs satellites were transferred to Intelsat Ltd., an Delaware corporation defined 
in the ORBIT Act as a successor entity.  Compare 47 U.S.C. § 769(a)(1) (defining 
INTELSAT) with 47 U.S.C. § 769(a)(7) (defining successor entity).  Because the 
statutory direct access requirement set forth at 47 U.S.C. § 765(a) applies only to the 
intergovernmental treaty organization INTELSAT and not to any private successor 
entit[ies], the statute no longer applies and the FCCs authority to repeal its direct access 
rule has been restored.  
16  For a collection of essays on the history of cable television in the United States, 
see Milestones: A History of Cable Television (Priscilla Walker & Matt Stump eds. 
1998).  For a history of international telecommunications satellites, see Charles H 
Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction to International Telecommunications 
(continued . . . ) 
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developed around these new communications technologies were (and remain) quite different 
from one another.  Cable television system operators, for example, directly serve the 
residential retail consumers that are cables end users.  International GEOs, in contrast, do 
not serve any retail consumers directly, but instead provide transmission capacity to the U.S. 
telecommunications carriers and other users (such as television networks and ISPs) who use 
that capacity to provide international calling, data, or video services to the public.  
Moreover, although subject to federal regulation in some limited respects, cable television is 
(and has always been) regulated primarily by the State and local authorities that must issue 
and renew cable franchises.17  GEOs, in contrast, are located 22,300 miles above the earth
beyond the regulatory reach of any State or local authority.  Accordingly, GEOs are 
regulated in some respects by the federal government,18 and in other respects by 
international treaty organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), an agency of the United Nations.19 
 
 In significant respects, however, the economics of cable television resembles that of 
international satellite communications.   Both industrieslike local telephonyoperate 
under conditions where the fixed cost of entry (constructing facilities) is unusually high in 
comparison with the low marginal cost of providing additional service once a facility has 
been built.20  Primarily because of the economic disincentive to subsequent entry that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law 50-97 (1996). 
17  See, e.g., Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 
1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982) ("[A] cable 
operator must lay the means of his medium underground or string it across poles in order 
to deliver his message.  Obviously, this manner of using the public domain entails 
significant disruption, especially to streets, alleys, and other public ways.  Some form of 
permission from the [local] government must, by necessity, precede such disruptive use 
of the public domain.  We do not see how it could be otherwise.  A city needs control 
over the number of times its citizens must bear the inconvenience of having its streets 
dug up and the best times for it to occur.) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
18  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-69 (setting forth federal statutes applicable to 
international telecommunications satellites that serve the United States); 47 C.F.R. Part 
25 (setting forth FCC regulations applicable to such satellites). 
19  See Charles H Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction to International 
Telecommunications Law 52-58 (1996). 
20  See, e.g. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (The cost of the cable grid appears to be the biggest cost of a 
cable television system and to be largely invariant to the number of subscribers the 
system has.  . . . [O]nce the grid is in placeonce every major street has a cable running 
above or below it that can be hooked up to the individual residences along the streetthe 
cost of adding another subscriber probably is small.  If so, the average cost of cable 
television would be minimized by having a single company in any given geographical 
(continued . . . ) 
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normally obtains under such conditions, both the international satellite telecommunications 
industry and the cable television industry were long believed to be inherently subject to 
natural monopolies.21  This economic theory of natural monopoly was reflected in the 
respective regulatory regimes that evolved around the two industries: in both cases, 
monopolies were originally protected, while rates were regulated.  
A. The Development of Cable Television as a Natural 
Monopoly.  
Historically, local government regulation of cable television systems has been 
premised upon cable companies need to use public streets and rights of way to lay or 
string their cable.22  Specifically, local governments have alleged that there is a sheer 
limit on the number of cables that can be strung on existing telephone poles.23  This 
sheer limit has been analogized to the physical spectrum scarcity that has served as a  
                                                                                                                                                 
area; for if there is more than one company and therefore more than one grid, the cost of 
each grid will be spread over a smaller number of subscribers, and the average cost per 
subscriber, and hence price, will be higher); see also pages __, infra (discussing the 
reasons why Congress in the early 1960s believed that an international satellite 
telecommunications system would constitute a natural monopoly). 
21  See, e.g. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (presenting economic argument for why cable television 
service has been thought to be a natural monopoly); Regulatory Policies And 
International Telecommunications, 2 FCC Rcd. 1022,  ¶ 18 (1987) (surveying reasons 
why international telecommunications service was historically thought to be a natural 
monopoly), modified in other respects, 4 FCC Rcd. 7387 (1988), and modified on 
further recon. in other respects, 7 FCC Rcd. 1715 (1992).   In economic theory, a 
natural monopoly is defined as a firm that can exist with decreasing returns if any 
specified required rate of output can be supplied most economically by a single firm or 
single system.  Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in 
Unnatural Monopolies 1, 15 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed. 1985); accord William W. 
Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly 4 (1982); see also McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Modern Economics 394 (2d ed. 1973) (defining natural monopoly as a natural 
condition that makes the optimum size of the firm so large in relation to the market that 
there is room for only one firm.). 
22  Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th 
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).  Local regulation has commonly taken 
the form of licensing or franchising cable companies.  Id. (citing Albert, The Federal 
and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 501, 508-13 (1977)). 
23  Id. at 1378. 
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justification for otherwise anomalous federal regulation of the use of the broadcast 
spectrum.24 
 
In addition, however, local governments have also advanced as a second basis for 
government regulation of cable entry.  Under the hybrid doctrine of medium scarcity, 
local government regulators have asserted that there are physical and economic 
limitations on the number of cable systems that can practicably operate in a given 
geographic area.25    That is, even though the sheer [physical] limit on the number of 
cables that can be strung on existing telephone poles might in some cases accommodate 
more than one such cable, some local governments have nonetheless also asserted that 
cable broadcasting is a monopolistic industry because it is not economically viable for 
more than one cable company to operate in any given geographic area.26  Together, 
proponents of medium scarcity theory have contended, cables dual physical and 
economic limitations give the industry the character of a natural monopoly and thus 
make the cable broadcasting medium scarce in much the same way that the finiteness of 
the electromagnetic spectrum makes wireless broadcasting a medium of essentially 
limited access.27 
 
 Based on the theory of medium scarcity, many local governments believed that it 
would be contrary to the public interest to permit competing cable systems to overbuild28 
one another within the same community.   Judge Richard Posner summarized (and 
endorsed) this view as follows:  
 
You can start with a competitive free-for-alldifferent cable 
television systems frantically building out their grids and signing 
                                                 
24  Id.; cf. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 397 (1969) (holding that but for spectrum 
scarcity, the existing system of broadcast licensing under the Communications Act of 
1934 might otherwise violate the First Amendment). 
25  Community Communications Co., Inc., 660 F.2d at 1378 (emphasis added). 
26  Id. 
27  Id.; see also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (cable televisions unique characteristics may constitute what 
economists call a natural monopoly, wherein the benefits, and indeed the very 
possibility, of competition are limited.). 
28  Cable overbuilding is defined as occurring when two or more wireline cable 
systems directly compete for subscribers in a local delivery market. Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans 
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 15 FCC Rcd. 16641, ¶ 45 n.66 (2000) (citation 
omitted).  Overbuilt cable systems would thus pose facilities-based intramodal 
competition to one another. 
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up subscribers in an effort to bring down their average costs faster 
than their rivalsbut eventually there will be only a single 
company, because until a company serves the whole market it will 
have an incentive to keep expanding in order to lower its average 
costs.  In the interim there may be wasteful duplication of 
facilities.  This duplication may lead not only to higher prices to 
cable television subscribers, at least in the short run, but also to 
higher costs to other users of the public ways, who must compete 
with the cable television companies for access to them.  An 
alternative procedure is to pick the most efficient competitor at the 
outset, give him a monopoly, and extract from him in exchange a 
commitment to provide reasonable service at reasonable rates.29 
 
For these or similar reasons, many local governments from the 1960s through the 
1980s sought to award, and protect, a monopoly franchise in cable service in their 
communities. 
B. The Development of the INTELSAT Satellite System as a 
Natural Monopoly.  
 In 1961, President John F. Kennedy called upon the United States to spearhead a 
cooperative international effort to develop and operate the worlds first global satellite 
communications system.30  President Kennedy proposed that the satellite system should  
provide global coverage, with nondiscriminatory access, at the earliest practicable date.31 
 
Beginning in 1961 and through the summer of 1962, Congress debated how best 
to achieve President Kennedys ambitious goal.32  Some legislators submitted proposals 
urging that the government build, finance, and operate the proposed satellite system.33     
Others favored allowing a consortium of existing U.S. telephone and telegraph 
companies to do the job.34    In contrast, the Kennedy Administration proposed to charter 
                                                 
29  Omega Satellite Prods. Co., 694 F.2d at 126. 
30  See Statement of the President on Communications Policy (July 24, 1961), 
appended to S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 25 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 
2287. 
31  Id.; see also U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), Part D (1962) 
(same). 
32  See Charles H Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction to International 
Telecommunications Law 65 (1996) (summarizing Congressional debate). 
33  See, e.g., S. 2890, 87th Cong. (1962). 
34  See, e.g., S. 2650, 87th Cong. (1962) (proposing carrier joint venture). 
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a new, private corporation to build and operate the U.S. portion of the proposed 
international system.35 
 
One key objective underlying the Administrations proposal to charter a new 
private corporation was to facilitate investment of private shareholder capital to finance, 
build, manage, and operate the U.S. portion of the proposed global satellite system.  The 
creation of a new private corporation ensured that neither the taxpayers generally,36 nor 
the ratepaying customers of the incumbent telephone and telegraph carriers, would be 
compelled to bear the risk that the satellite system would not succeed.  Instead, only those 
persons who voluntarily chose to invest in the new corporation would incur the risk 
associated with the corporations obligation to plan, initiate, construct . . . and operate 
the satellite system.37  Moreover, ownership of the new corporation would be structured 
in a manner to encourage the widest distribution to the American public.38   
 
Congress in 1962 believed that private investment in the new corporation would 
entail unusually high risk.39    Accordingly, Congress recognized that in a large measure 
the investors who would invest in the corporation will rely on the action of the Congress 
today to see to it that [the corporation] has a means to . . . make adequate earnings to 
justify their investment and their confidence in [the corporation].40  Thus, to enable 
                                                 
35  See, e.g., Communications Satellite Legislation: Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 
Before the Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Science, 87th Cong. 388 (1962) 
(testimony of Deputy Attorney Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) (articulating the 
Administrations preference that there would be one corporation engaged in the 
transmission of messages by satellite, performing services for all authorized 
communications carriers in this country. . . .). 
36  See 108 Cong. Rec. S16694 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1962)  (statement of Sen. 
Humphrey) (supporting the bill primarily because the cost of this communications 
satellite system will be privately financed rather than have it come out of the Federal 
budget. . . .  What we are attempting to do is to adapt the resources of the country and to 
bring in the capital through other means than taxation.). 
 
37  47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(1). 
38  47 U.S.C. § 734(a). 
39  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 11 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2273  (it should be recognized that purchase of [the new corporations] stock will be 
speculative); 108 Cong. Rec. H7502 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Harris) 
(it is most important that the membership of the House and the investing public be 
completely aware of [the] unusual circumstances which render investments in this new 
corporation highly speculative). 
40  108 Cong. Rec. H7525 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
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investors to earn an adequate return if the satellite system proved successful, President 
Kennedy and his Congressional supporters favored granting the new corporation an 
exclusive right to furnish the channels of communication of the system to carriers and 
users located in the United States.41 
 
Another key objective underlying the Kennedy Administrations proposal was to 
interpose the new corporation as a counterweight to AT&T, which was then a monopoly 
carrier that had already made substantial investments in transoceanic submarine cable, as 
well as nascent investments in satellite technology.  The Administration sought to prevent 
AT&T from using its substantial market power to dominate any consortium of existing 
carriers, and thereby possibly thwarting the new satellite systems development or driving 
weaker rivals from the field.42  The Administrations desire to counterbalance AT&Ts 
dominance was given additional effect by structural safeguards designed [t]o prevent 
any single interest or group of interests from dominating the activities of the [proposed 
new] corporation. . . .43 
 
The Administrations proposal to create a new private monopoly was not without 
its critics, in Congress and elsewhere.  Congressional critics of the proposal complained 
that U.S. communications carriers carrying international trafficand foreign carriers 
carrying U.S.-bound trafficshould not be required to deal[] with a third partythe 
                                                 
41  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 28 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2269, 2289 (statement of President Kennedy) (characterizing COMSAT as by nature a 
Government-created monopoly. . . .); Communications Satellite Act of 1962, S. Rep. No. 
87-1319, at 2 (1962) (The President indicated in his statement accompanying the 
proposal that such a corporation was by nature a Government-created monopoly. . . .); 
see also 108 Cong. Rec. H7505 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Cellar) 
(noting that in the Satellite Act, we are creating here a private monopoly.) (emphasis 
added).  See generally COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C. 2d 564, 587 ¶ 54 (1980) (the Satellite 
Act creates a single entity in the form of a private corporation to carry out its objectives 
and purposes  [and] endows [COMSAT] with extraordinary powers and privileges to 
carry out its mission, including monopoly status in the provision of services via the 
satellite system to authorized U.S. users.); accord id. at 591 (same). 
42  See, e.g., Communications Satellites: Hearings on HR. 10115 and H.R. 10138 
Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., 
pt. 2, at 563 (1962) (statement of Atty Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (contending that an 
AT&T-led carrier consortium would not have the same interest in promoting and 
guaranteeing nondiscriminatory use and equitable access to the system by competitors as 
would an independent corporation); see also Delbert D. Smith, Communication Via 
Satellite 74 (1976) (Concern over the possibility of an AT&T monopoly was one factor 
that prompted [Congress to] reorient[] . . . the direction that commercialization seemed to 
be following). 
43  S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 11 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2272. 
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satellite corporation, in order to access the facilities of the satellite system.44  
Nonetheless, after extensive debate, Congress enacted the essence of the Kennedy 
Administration proposal as the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Satellite Act).45 
 
The opening provisions of the Satellite Act provided that United States 
participation in the global system shall be in the form of a private corporation.46  That 
corporation was to operate for profit.47  The Act authorized the corporation (COMSAT) 
to own and operate the U.S. portion of the proposed global satellite system and to 
furnish, for hire, channels of communication to U.S. carriers and other U.S. users of 
that system.48  The Act also directed the FCC to insure that all of COMSATs authorized 
carrier-customers have nondiscriminatory use of and equitable access to the system 
under just and reasonable rates, terms, and conditions.49 
 
Consistent with the Kennedy proposal, a basic tenet of the Satellite Act . . . [was 
that at] least insofar as international common carrier communications services are 
concerned, Comsat is given a virtual statutory monopoly position with respect to the 
operation of the space segment of the commercial communications satellite system.50  
                                                 
44  108 Cong. Rec. H7701 (daily ed. May 3, 1962) (statement of Rep. Hemphill). See 
also S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 51 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2309 
(minority views) (opposing proposal to create a private corporation that would own and 
operate the U.S. portion of a worldwide satellite communications system on ground that 
[t]his corporation would be a Government-created monopoly.); see also, e.g., 108 
Cong. Rec. H7515 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Kowalski) (Let us make 
no mistake about the bill before usit proposes to place in private hands a Government-
created monopoly. . . .). 
45  Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 425 (1962), 
codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-769 (Satellite Act). 
46  47 U.S.C. § 701(c) (emphasis added).  The corporation that was formed pursuant 
to the Act was named Communications Satellite Corporation, or COMSAT.  Later, 
the corporation formally changed its named to the Comsat Corporation. 
47  47 U.S.C. § 731. 
48  47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(1)-(2). 
49  47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(2). 
50  Authorized Entities & Authorized Users Under the Communications Satellite Act 
of 1962, 4 F.C.C. 2d 421, 428 (1966) (Authorized User I) (emphasis in original), 
overruled by, Modification of Authorized User Policy, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1394 (1982) 
(Authorized User II), affd and remanded, ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 
725 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.1984). 
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Indeed, the FCC characterized the general concept pervading the Satellite Act as being 
the establishment of Comsat as a monopoly (insofar as the space segment of 
international communications is concerned) and as primarily a carriers carrier, created to 
provide at least the space segment of international communications as part of an 
improved global communications network consisting of all means of providing such 
communications services, so that lower rates should be possible to all the using public.51 
 
After incorporating as a District of Columbia corporation in 1963, COMSAT 
immediately sought foreign partners willing to participate in establishing the proposed 
satellite system.  In 1965, an ad hoc partnership led by COMSAT and involving 44 
nations successfully launched into geostationary orbit the worlds first commercial 
communications satellite, Early Bird.52  In 1971, after several more satellites had been 
launched by COMSAT-led ad hoc international partnerships,53 85 nations formed the 
permanent intergovernmental satellite organization, INTELSAT, to continue and carry 
forward on a definitive basis the design, development, construction, establishment, 
operation and maintenance of the space segment of the global commercial 
telecommunications satellite system. . . .54  By virtue of its statutory role under the 1962 
Satellite Act, COMSAT was designated as the U.S. Signatory to the Operating 
Agreement of INTELSAT.55   
                                                 
51  Id. at 430; see also Charles H Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction to 
International Telecommunications Law 74 (1996) (The Satellite Act created COMSAT 
as a corporation whose sole purpose [was] to act as the intermediary between INTELSAT 
and the U.S. international carriers, and gave it a perennial monopoly.) (emphasis 
added). 
52  See Communications Satellite Corporation, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 369, 371 
(1965).   
53  See COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C. 2d 564, ¶¶ 63-65 (1980) (describing interim 
arrangements). 
54  Agreement Relating to The International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization INTELSAT Art. II(a), done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 
7532 (INTELSAT Agreement); see also id., 23 U.S.T. at 4066-4083 (listing the 85 
nations that founded INTELSAT).   By 2000, just before INTELSAT was privatized, the 
number of member nations that had become Signatories to the INTELSAT Agreement 
had risen to 144.  See United States Department of State, Treaties In Force: A List of 
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force as of January 
1, 2000 457-58 (2000) (listing INTELSAT member nations), 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/tif_01e.pdf>. 
55 S. Rep. No. 95-1036, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5272, 5275.  
See also Senate Report on International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act, S. 
Rep. No. 95-1036, at 15 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286 (J.A. 406) (COMSAT was 
created by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to foster the establishment of a 
(continued . . . ) 
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In 1978, COMSAT was also designated as the U.S. Signatory to the International 
Maritime Satellite Organization Inmarsat, a second international treaty organization 
modeled on INTELSAT, which was chartered in order to develop and operate a global 
maritime satellite telecommunications system whose facilities would serve the maritime 
commercial and safety needs of the United States and foreign countries.56  As with 
INTELSAT, COMSAT was to enjoy an exclusive franchise in furnishing the satellite 
space segment capacity of the Inmarsat system for communications between ships on the 
ocean and the United States.57 
 
C. The Regulatory Responses To Natural Monopoly in the 
International Satellite Telecommunications and Cable 
Television Industries.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both the international satellite 
telecommunications industry and the local cable television industry were considered by 
regulators to be natural monopolies.58  For this reason, substantially similar regulatory 
principles were brought to bear on these two seemingly unrelated industries.   
                                                                                                                                                 
global satellite system and represent the United States in the operation aspects of that 
system.  COMSAT is therefore the U.S. Signatory to the Operating Agreement of 
INTELSAT.) (emphasis added).  As U.S. Signatory to INTELSAT, COMSAT signed 
the INTELSAT Operating Agreement on behalf of the United States, and represents the 
United States within INTELSAT.  See INTELSAT Agreement Art. I(g), 23 U.S.T. at 
3816 (defining Signatory); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 721(a), 735(a), 742; Operating 
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
INTELSAT, Art. 2, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091 (INTELSAT Operating 
Agreement) (setting forth rights and obligations of Signatories).   
56  See International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act § 503(a)(1), 
Pub. L. No. 95-564, 92 Stat. 2392 (1978).codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 752(a)(1) 
(designating COMSAT as the sole operating entity of the United States for participation 
in INMARSAT, for the purpose of providing international maritime satellite 
telecommunications services.). 
57  See COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C. 2d 564, ¶ 86 (1980) (INMARSAT will not 
involve a competitive marketplace environment.  Comsat is the sole U.S. provider of 
space segment capacity obtained from INMARSAT; it will interconnect on a 
participating carrier basis with authorized U.S. domestic or international carriers for the 
extension of maritime satellite services with the United States and beyond.  . . . Comsat 
will receive and assemble all traffic for appropriate routing, either inbound or 
outbound.) (footnote and citation omitted). 
58  See Subpart II.A., supra (cable/MVPD); Subpart II.B, supra (international 
satellite telecommunications). 
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For example, as natural monopolies, both the incumbent local cable TV system 
operators and COMSAT were shielded by law against intramodal competition, which was 
thought to be wasteful.  Thus, until the mid-1980s, incumbent cable operators generally 
were shielded by local franchising authorities against the development of competing 
overbuilt cable systems in the same local market.59   Analogously, during the same 
period, COMSAT was shielded by the FCC against the development of separate 
geostationary satellite systems capable of competing against INTELSAT to provide U.S.-
international communications services.60  
 
Conversely, neither incumbent local cable operators nor COMSAT ever were 
shielded by law against intermodal competition.   Cable TV, of course, always faced at 
least some competition from free over-the-air broadcast TV.61  Moreover, no law shielded 
                                                 
59  See, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 
711, 713-18 (8th Cir. 1986); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 
1563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 1053 (1984); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of 
Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-80 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 
(1982); Lamb Enters. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 1972); accord 
Kent D. Wakeford, Note, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted Intrusion Into 
Competitive Markets, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 233, 246 (1995) (Under the assumption that 
cities could only economically support one cable franchise, municipal authorities issued 
exclusive franchises in the form of local monopolies.).  For critical discussions of the 
history of municipal regulation of cable entry, see id. at 246-71 and Thomas W. Hazlett, 
Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television 
Franchise, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1335, 1358-59 (1986) (discussing political and economic 
incentives for local public authorities to use the cable franchising process a vehicle to 
create durable monopolistic profit opportunities for their political supporters). 
60  The Satellite Act itself did not preclude the development of separate international 
satellite systems capable of competing against INTELSAT.  See 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (It 
is not the intent of Congress by this chapter to preclude . . . the creation of additional 
communications satellite systems, if required to meet unique governmental needs or if 
otherwise required in the national interest.).  Under the INTELSAT Agreement, 
however, the INTELSAT treaty organization was vested with a right to veto the 
development of any separate international satellite systems that would cause economic 
harm to INTELSAT.  Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization INTELSAT, Art. XIV(d), done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813 
(INTELSAT Agreement).  Although INTELSAT never actually exercised this veto, the 
initial opposition of the United States to the development of separate systems may have 
delayed the development of competing geostationary communications satellite systems 
from many years.  See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction to 
International Telecommunications Law 79-80 (1996). 
61  The cable industry has long argued that it had no monopoly character because 
(continued . . . ) 
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cable against the competition that eventually arose from other multichannel video 
programming distributors (MVPDs), such as direct broadcast satellite (DBS) and 
terrestrial wireless cable service.62  Similarly, the INTELSAT system from its inception 
faced intermodal competition, albeit limited, in the international telecommunications 
market from terrestrial facilities such as transoceanic submarine cables and short wave 
radio.63  For various reasons, however (probably including both technological 
considerations and the advantages of incumbency), intermodal competition made no 
substantial competitive inroads against either cable TV or INTELSAT until relatively 
recently.64  Thus, both international satellite telecommunications and cable TV emerged 
                                                                                                                                                 
over-the-air television . . . and videodisks . . . offer[ed] competing sources of video 
entertainment. . . .  Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 173 (1983).  In 1983, 
however, a leading commentator analogized such claims to those of  a railroad operator 
in the nineteenth century denying being a monopolist because anyone refused access to a 
train could use a horse and buggy.  Id. 
62  See Satellite Television Corporation Authority to Construct an Experimental 
Direct Broadcast Satellite System, 91 F.C.C. 2d 953 (1982) (approving the first 
applications to provide DBS service), aff'd sub nom., National Assn of Broadcasters v. 
FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984);  see also Private Operational-Fixed Microwave 
Service, Multipoint Distribution Service, Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, 
Instructional Television Fixed Service, and Cable Television Relay Service, 5 FCC Rcd. 
6410 (1990) (authorizing new wireless cable service analogous to DBS service, but 
transmitting from terrestrial broadcast towers rather than from satellites), corrected, 5 
FCC Rcd. 6666 (1990), modified, 6 FCC Rcd. 6764 (1991), further modified, 10 FCC 
Rcd. 7074 (1995), and clarified on denial of recon., 11 FCC Rcd. 17003 (1996). 
63  Undersea cables provided the first mean of transmission for voice 
communication between the U.S. and foreign points. The first successful trans-Atlantic 
[telegraph] cable was run between Ireland and Newfoundland in 1865 and the first 
undersea telephone cable between Europe and the U.S. was TAT-1, laid in 1956.  Alieen 
A. Pisciotta, Randall W. Sifers, Heather Wilson Aspasia, & A. Paroutsas, Regulatory 
Considerations Affecting Investments In Global Satellite and Undersea Cable Systems, 
1263 PLI/Corp 399, 415 (2001).  As early as 1870, transoceanic submarine cables had 
been used to connect five port cities in China with Shanghai. See Zhou He, A History of 
Telecommunications In China: Development and Policy Implications, in 
Telecommunications and Development in China 55, 57-60 (Paul S.N. Lee ed., 1997). 
64  See Part III, infra (discussing the onset of intermodal competition). Even today, 
despite facing substantial facilities-based intermodal competition, cable continues to 
control a dominant share of the residential market for the delivery of multichannel video 
programming (MVPD market).  See In re Annual Assessment of Status of Competition 
in Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 
1244, ¶¶ 7-8, 13 (2002) (noting that as of mid-2001, almost 69 million Americans were 
subscribing to cable television service, while only 19.3 million American homes were 
subscribing to non-cable MVPDs, most prominently Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) 
(continued . . . ) 
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as de facto monopolies, freed by law from facing any intramodal competition, and by 
circumstances from facing any intermodal competition. 
 
Despite their respective monopolies, however, until recently neither INTELSAT 
nor incumbent cable systems were rendered subject to the panoply of unbundling or 
interconnection requirements that have long applied to telecommunications common 
carriers in possession of similar monopolies.65   This result was not inevitable.  In 1970, 
for example, several members of a commission on cable television established by the 
Sloan Foundation concluded that cable television systems should immediately be 
regulated as common carriers.66  Moreover, a 1973 report by a Presidential Cabinet 
Committee on Cable Communications proposed an evolutionary approach under which 
cable operators would initially be permitted to select the programming carried over their 
cable systems, but would later be subject to common carrier regulation when cable 
penetration reached 50 percent of American homes.67  Similarly, as discussed above, 
Congress in 1962 considered alternative approaches to organizing the proposed 
                                                                                                                                                 
service). 
65  Since the beginning of the century, all telecommunications common carriers have 
borne a duty to provide service to other carriers at just and nondiscriminatory rates.  See, 
e.g., People ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn of N.Y., 129 N.E. 
220, 222 (N.Y. 1920).  This duty of physical interconnection at just and reasonable rates 
is reflected in the Communications Act of 1934, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 205, and was 
expanded considerably in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-59.  
See generally Charles H. Kennedy, An Introduction to U.S. Telecommunications Law 35-
36 (2d ed. 2001) (incumbent LECs own and control an overwhelming preponderance of 
the switches, access lines, and other facilities through which non-ILEC service providers 
must reach their customers, and the ILECs decisions concerning when and on what 
terms they will make their networks available to others can determine the extentor 
indeed the very existenceof competition in a wide range of markets.  For this reason 
Congress, the FCC, the state PUCs, and the antitrust courts have intervened extensively 
to dictate when, to whom, and on what terms the ILECs will offer wholesale services and 
facilities); Howard Shelanski, Regulating at the Technological Edge: New Challenges 
For the FCC, 2000 L. Rev. Mich. St. U. Det. C.L. 3, 4 (2000) (explaining the scope of 
the LEC unbundling requirements set forth in the 1996 Act).  
66  Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 169 & n.33 (1983) (citing On The 
Cable (1971)) . 
67  Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 169 & n.34 (1983) (citing Cabinet 
Committee on Cable Communications, CableReport to the President (1974)).  See also 
Robert A. Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access Under 
The First Amendment, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1001 (1981) (arguing that cables monopoly 
status combined with its abundance of channels should give rise to affirmative duty to 
provide access to unaffiliated programmers). 
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international satellite system that would have rendered its satellites fully subject to 
traditional common carrier obligations.68      
 
 In the main, however, the regulatory regimes that developed around cable 
television reflected the traditional view that the one-way delivery of television 
programs, movies, and sporting events is not a traditional common carrier activity and 
should not be regulated as such.69  Accordingly, while [t]he Commission has long had 
rules that require cable operators to reserve system capacity for programming produced 
by certain content providers unaffiliated with the cable operator,70 these rules have not 
required cable operators to interconnect their systems with those of other cable operators.  
Nor (except in the limited context of leased access) have cable operators been required 
to provide any general right of channel access to unaffiliated content providers on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.71  Analogously, until the advent of direct access in 1999, 
                                                 
68  See, e.g., S. 2650, 87th Cong. (1962) (proposing that the satellite system be 
constructed by a consortium of existing U.S. telecommunications common carriers); 
S. 2890, 87th Cong. (1962) (proposing that the government build, finance, and operate 
the proposed satellite system, and provide nondiscriminatory access to all carriers). 
69  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 61 & n.232 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002).  This traditional view was  codified 
in the Cable Act of 1984.  See 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (Any cable system shall not be subject 
to regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service.). 
70  Howard Shelanski, Regulating at the Technological Edge: New Challenges For 
the FCC, 2000 L. Rev. Mich. St. U. Det. C.L. 3, 7 (2000).  These rules include: the 
must-carry rules which require cable carriage of the broadcast signals of most local 
over-the-air broadcast channels, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35; the PEG rules which require 
carriage of a certain amount of noncommercial educational programming provided by the 
local franchising authority or its assignee, 47 U.S.C. § 531; and the leased access rules 
which reserve certain cable channels for hourly commercial lease by unaffiliated third 
parties, 47 U.S.C. § 532.  The must-carry rules survived a First Amendment challenge 
in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).  The PEG and leased 
access rules were substantially sustained in Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications 
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
71  In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth 
Circuit suggested in dicta that because cable modem services are not cable services 
under the Communications Act, it would lead to absurd results, inconsistent with the 
statutory structure to construe the leased access provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 532 as 
vesting unaffiliated ISPs with a right to lease cable channel capacity in order to offer 
high-speed Internet service.  Subsequently, the FCCs affirmed the Ninth Circuits view 
that cable modem services are not cable services under the Act.  In re Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 2002 WL 407567, 
(continued . . . ) 
 20 
 
INTELSAT was not required to provide unbundled raw satellite capacity to unaffiliated 
international telecommunications carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis.  Instead, 
INTELSATs U.S. affiliate COMSAT enjoyed an exclusive right to furnish INTELSAT 
transmission capacity to carriers and users located in the United States, where such 
capacity was often bundled with other services provided by COMSAT.72   
 
In lieu of relying on unbundling or interconnection requirements, regulators 
sought to control the monopoly power of both COMSAT and cable operators primarily 
through direct regulation of rates and services.73  Thus, under the Satellite Act, the FCC 
exercised direct regulatory authority over the rates charged by COMSAT for INTELSAT 
transmission capacity,74 and over the selection and the quality of COMSATs service 
offerings.75  Similarly, except during the late 1980s (when federal law preempted most 
                                                                                                                                                 
¶ 60 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) .  In so doing, the FCC appears to have eliminated any lingering 
possibility that the cable leased access rules might some day serve as a vehicle for 
implementing cable open access.  Cf., e.g., Comments of Consumer and ISP 
Representatives at 3, 6-10; Comments of Consumers Union et al. at 22, both filed in GEN 
Docket No. 00-185 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (each arguing for implementation of cable open 
access under the cable leased access rules). 
72  See pages __, supra; see also, e.g., Alexandra M. Field, Note, INTELSAT At A 
Crossroads, 25 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1335, 1341 (1994) (the Satellite Act gave 
COMSAT a host of powers, the most important of which was monopoly status in the 
provision of the U.S. satellite links.) (emphasis added). 
73  These regulatory tools were also included in the arsenal available to regulators of 
common carrier LECs.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203-05 (imposing rate regulation on 
telecommunications common carriers); id. §§ 208, 214 (imposing quality-of-service 
regulation on telecommunications common carriers). Unlike international satellite or 
cable operators, however, common carrier LECs were subject to access and unbundling 
requirements in addition to rate and quality-of-service regulation.  See note __, supra.  
74  See 47 U.S.C. § 741(a) (deeming COMSAT subject to common carrier rate 
regulation in its provision of INTELSAT satellite capacity and earth station services); 47 
U.S.C. § 721(c)(2) (1994) (authorizing the FCC to regulate the charges, classifications, 
practices, regulations, and other terms and conditions and [to] regulate the manner in 
which available facilities of the [satellite] system and [earth] stations are allocated among 
such users thereof) (repealed in 2000); In re COMSAT Corp. Reclassification as a Non-
Dominant Carrier, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 8 (1998) (COMSAT Non-Dominant Order) 
(noting that COMSATs rates are subject to common carrier regulation under the Satellite 
Act), modified on recon., 14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999).  In 1998, COMSAT was 
substantially reclassified as a nondominant common carrier, and relieved from rate 
regulation on the large majority of its U.S.-international routes.  See id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
75  Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(3)-(11) (1994)  
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local rate and service regulation), local cable franchising authorities sought to control the 
monopoly power of cable operators by directly regulating the rates and service offerings 
of cable franchisees.76   In sum, for many years, there were substantial parallels between 
COMSAT and local cable operators with respect to both the nature of their respective 
natural monopolies, and the regulatory responses thereto. 
 
III. The Rise of Competition in the Cable Television and International Satellite 
Telecommunications Industries. 
 Despite the economic theory of natural monopoly and the legal and regulatory 
regimes that were constructed in its image, it turned out thatas with the telephone 
industryputative competitors did wish to enter both the cable television and international 
satellite telecommunications industries, and to compete against the entrenched incumbent 
natural monopolies.77  Slowly, government responded to these competitors pleas.  During 
                                                 
76  See House Report on Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, H.R. Rep. No. 
98-934, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4656 (Cable television has 
been regulated at the local government level through the franchise process.  A municipal 
franchise granted to a cable operator has commonly specified . . . the service to be 
provided, and the rate which may be charged for those services.  The 1984 Act 
substantially preempted such local rate and service regulation.   See Pub. L. No. 98-549, 
98 Stat. 2779 (1984); see also H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 24-25 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4661-62 (asserting that some municipal franchising authorities had 
imposed unrealistic service requirements without permitting franchisees to price their 
services properly).  In 1992, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act substantially reinstated local government regulation of cable rates. See Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992); see also Time Warner v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (sustaining FCC rules implementing the 1992 Act).  Subsequently, however, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 heralded a partial return to deregulation by limiting the 
regulatory authority of local franchising authorities only to encompass rates charged for 
basic tier service, and not the rates charged for cable programming service (i.e. CNN, 
MTV, ESPN, etc.).  See 47 U.S.C. § 543. 
For critical discussions of the history of local regulation of retail cable TV rates, 
see Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 161-205 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  For 
critical discussions of the economic theory underlying local regulation of retail cable TV 
rates, see Donald J. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of Private over Public Interest, 44 
Ala. L. Rev. 355, 362-66 (1993); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of 
Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 98 (1972). 
77  See Glen O. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances With Regulators, 97 
Colum. L. Rev. 1016, 1044 n.87 (1997) (Today, the idea that cable should be treated as 
a natural monopoly is so unpopular not even the cable industry openly voices it. The 
basis for that unpopularity partly reflects skepticism about the degree of scale economies. 
(continued . . . ) 
 22 
 
the 1980s, following the consent decree that broke up AT&Ts telephone monopoly and 
introduced a measure of competition into long-distance telephony,78 the U.S. government 
reversed its prior course and sought to permit and, indeed, encourage similar competition in 
the cable and satellite industries. 
A. The Introduction of Competition Against Incumbent Cable 
Television System Operators.  
 The first branch of government to act in favor of introducing facilities-based 
competition to the cable television industry was the judicial branch.  In a series of cases 
beginning in the early 1980s, federal courts began to conceptualize local ordinances granting 
monopoly cable franchises as prior restraints against the speech of putative cable 
competitors, potentially subject to First Amendment limitation.79  The Supreme Court 
tentatively adopted this view in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.,80 in 
which it held that the First Amendment principle of the marketplace of ideas prohibits a 
municipality with excess utility pole capacity from awarding a monopoly cable franchise.  
Congress later followed the courts lead, by providing in the 1992 Cable Act that a 
franchising authority may not grant an exclusive franchise and may not unreasonably 
refuse to award an additional competitive franchise.81 
 
 Since the origin of intramodal cable competition in the 1980s, deployment of 
competing (or overbuilt) systems has been slow.82  Of the 33,000 cable community units 
                                                                                                                                                 
Even more, however, it reflects revised thinking about the policy implications: modern 
policy analysts do not see that large economies of scale necessarily foreclose the 
possibility or the desirability of active competition.) (citing Thomas W. Hazlett, Private 
Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television 
Franchise, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1335 (1986)). Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Douglas Gary 
Lichtman, & Howard A. Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy 379 (2001) 
(querying why is it that often the legal response to natural monopoly is to restrict 
entry? and whether the entrance of a competitor into a market mean[s] that the market 
is not properly characterized as a natural monopoly?). 
78  United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
79  See, e.g., Community Communications Corp. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 
1376-77 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001(1982); Omega Satellite Products 
v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.1982); Tele-Communications of Key 
West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
80  476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986). 
81  Cable Act of 1992 § 621(a)(1), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
82  Cable overbuilding is defined as occurring when two or more wireline cable 
(continued . . . ) 
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nationwide, [a]s of year-end 1999, competing franchises [had] been awarded for service 
to [only] 369 communities in 34 states.83  As of July 2000, the FCC had certified that 
overbuilt cable systems were actually operating and providing effective competition to 
the incumbent providers in 330 of these 369 individual communities.84   In January, 2002, 
however, the FCC declined to provide an updated count of overbuilt communities, while 
suggesting that many overbuilders are facing difficulties in obtaining capital . . . [and 
therefore] have scaled back plans, reduced capital expenditures, reduced staffs, or shut 
down operations altogether.85 
 
 On the other hand, cable television since the 1980s has faced increasing 
intermodal competition from other, newer multichannel video programming distributors 
                                                                                                                                                 
systems directly compete for subscribers in a local delivery market. Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans 
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 15 FCC Rcd. 16641, ¶ 45 n.66 (2000) (citation 
omitted). 
83  In re Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video 
Programming, Seventh Annual Report, 16 FCC Rcd. 6005, 22 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1414, 
¶ 37 & n.110 (2001).  Because some of the nations most densely populated cable 
communities number among the 369 in which competitive systems have been authorized, 
however, franchised cable overbuilders currently have the potential to serve more than 
18.5 million [of Americas 105.5 million television] homes.  Id.  By way of comparison, 
as of June 2001, 69 million homes subscribed to cable television service provided by 
incumbent franchisees, and another 1.5 million subscribed to non-franchised SMATV 
service, which uses substantially the same technology used by franchised cable TV 
systems, but serves apartment buildings without using public rights-of-way.  In re Annual 
Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video Programming, 
Eighth Annual Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 1244, ¶ 7, 13 (2002).  Only twenty percent of 
American households (i.e., about 20.7 million households) currently watch television via 
free, over-the-air terrestrial broadcast signals.  Id. ¶ 79. 
84  Id. ¶ 37; see also 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1) (defining four possible alternative bases 
for determining that an incumbent cable TV system is now subject to effective 
competition, and hence relieved from rate regulation). 
85  In re Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video 
Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 1244, ¶ 108 (2002).  The 
Commission in the Eighth Annual Report did announced that [o]f the 33,000 cable 
community units nationwide, 419, or approximately one percent have been certified by 
the Commission as having effective competition as a result of consumers having a choice 
of more than one MVPD.  Id. ¶ 120.  This new figure of 419, however, includes not just 
communities that have been overbuilt by a competing wireline system, but also those in 
which DBS satellite has gained a market share sufficient to provide effective intermodal 
competition to the incumbent cable operator.   
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(MVPDs), which can provide many of the same (or substitutable) services.86  Most 
prominent among these new competing MVPDs are satellite dish providers.87  Cable is 
also subject to limited (but potentially increasing) competition from Open Video 
Systems that can be provided by Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) or electric utility 
companies through modified telephone or electrical lines.88  At the low end, cable 
continued to face (price) competition from conventional broadcast television, from home 
video sales and rentals, and from terrestrial wireless cable.89  Accordingly, while the 
FCC recently concluded that [c]able television still is the dominant technology for the 
delivery of video programming to consumers in the MVPD marketplace, it also noted 
that cables market share continues to decline.90  
B. The Introduction of Competition Against INTELSAT. 
Although Congress initially contemplated the INTELSAT system to be a natural 
monopoly with respect to international satellite telecommunications, the FCC as early as 
1966 proposed to authorize the construction and operation of separate, non-INTELSAT 
satellite systems to provide domestic satellite service, both to augment the long-haul 
terrestrial facilities of existing telecommunications carriers for point-to-point switched 
transmission services, and also to connect off-shore distant domestic points (i.e., Alaska, 
                                                 
86  As of June 2001, a total of 19.3 million American homes were subscribing to non-
cable multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), most prominently Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) service. In re Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in 
Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 1244, 
¶¶ 7, 13 (2002). 
87  Id. ¶ 13.  The FCC characterizes all residential satellite dish service collectively as 
Direct-to-Home (DTH) satellite service.  The DTH category consists of two 
subcategories: the popular DBS service (which generally uses a twelve-inch satellite 
dish), and the older but less popular HSD service (which requires a much larger dish).  
As of June 2001, sixteen million American households were subscribing to DBS service, 
and another 1 million to HSD.  Id.  Collectively, the two DTH satellite services are 
capable of providing service to virtually every U.S. home that cable can serve, as well as 
some homes not yet passed by cable. 
88  Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(D).  For a history of the FCCs policy 
transition from prohibiting to encouraging the deployment of OVS, see Glen O. 
Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances With Regulators, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 
1016 (1997). 
89  In re Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video 
Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 1244, ¶¶ 13, 79 (2002). 
90  Id. ¶ 2. 
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Hawaii, Puerto Rico) to the contiguous states.91  In so proposing, the FCC also 
contemplated that non-INTELSAT domestic satellites might some day be used to provide 
point-to-multipoint services, such as broadcast program transmission.92   In 1970, the 
FCC acted on its earlier proposals by adopting an open skies policy under which 
qualified private applicants could be authorized to construct and operate domestic 
satellite systems capable of competing against both the domestic terrestrial carriers and 
INTELSAT in the long-haul domestic telecommunications market.93  The open skies 
policy paved the way for the development of a domestic satellite communications 
industry.  
 
Even while crafting an open skies policy for domestic satellite communications, 
however, the FCCs DOMSAT I and DOMSAT II Orders protected INTELSAT against 
the advent of intramodal competition in the market for U.S.-international satellite 
telecommunications capacity.  In part, the FCCs decision to preserve INTELSATs 
monopoly was influenced by the terms of the INTELSAT Agreement, which permitted 
INTELSAT itself to veto the development of any separate international satellite systems that 
would cause economic harm to INTELSAT.94  However, as international 
telecommunications traffic expanded rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, INTELSAT 
did consent to the development of several competing separate systems that provided 
competitive regional international service in different parts of the world.95 
                                                 
91  See Notice of Inquiry, 31 Fed. Red. 3507 (Mar. 2, 1966); Supplemental Notice of 
Inquiry, 31 Fed. Reg. 13763 (Oct. 20, 1966). 
92    Id.; see also Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities By 
Non-Governmental Entities, Second Report and Order, 35 FCC 2d 844, ¶ 4 (1972) 
(DOMSAT II Order), recon. denied, 38 FCC 2d 665 (1972), aff'd sub nom, Network 
Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
93  See Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities By Non-
Governmental Entities, First Report and Order, 22 FCC 2d 86, 93 (1970) (DOMSAT I 
Order). 
94  Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization INTELSAT, Art. XIV(d), done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813 
(INTELSAT Agreement).  The economic harm requirement was justified as a means 
of protecting INTELSAT against cream-skimming in order to safeguard INTELSATs 
ability to serve every country on earth, regardless of cost, on non-discriminatory terms and 
conditions.  See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction To 
International Telecommunications Law 79-80 (1996). 
95  See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction To International 
Telecommunications Law 80 (1996) (The first separate system to receive approval was 
[Western Europes] EUTELSAT in 1979, which was soon followed by [Southeast Asias] 
PALAPA and [the Middle Easts] ARABSAT.). 
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On November 28, 1984, President Reagan determine[d] that separate international 
communications satellite systems [were] required in the national interest.96   Accordingly, 
both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce were jointly directed to inform 
the Federal Communications Commission of criteria necessary to ensure the United 
States meets its international obligations [under the INTELSAT Agreement] and to 
further its telecommunications and foreign policy interests by establishing separate 
satellite systems to compete against the INTELSAT system.97  In 1985, the FCC 
responded to the Presidents directive by authorizing, for the first time, the licensing of 
separate international satellite systems.98  In 1988, the Connecticut-based PanAmSat 
Corp. launched the PAS-1 Atlantic Ocean Region satellite, the first U.S. private-sector 
satellite to provide international satellite services.99  By 1999, more than 200 commercial 
geosynchronous satellites were orbiting the earth, of which approximately 73 served the 
United States.100  Of these, only 17 satellites belonged to INTELSAT, of which just 13 
                                                 
96  Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46987, 1984 WL 88118 (Nov. 
28, 1984).  For discussions of the deliberations that led to this Presidential determination, 
see Bert W. Rein & Carl R. Frank, The Legal Commitment of the United States to the 
INTELSAT System, 14 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 219, 225-27 (1989); Richard R. Colino, 
A Chronicle of Policy and Procedure: The Formulation of the Reagan Administration 
Policy on International Satellite Telecommunications, 13 J. Space L. 103 (1985); Richard 
R. Colino, The Possible Introduction of Separate Satellite Systems: International Satellite 
Communications at the Crossroad, 24 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 13 (1985). 
97  Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46987, 1984 WL 88118 (Nov. 
28, 1984). 
98  See Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 
101 FCC 2d 1046 (1985) (Separate Systems Order), modified on recon., 61 
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 649 (1986), further recon. denied, 1 FCC Rcd 439 (1986).  Until 
1996, these separate international systems were restricted from interconnecting directly 
with the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).  Compare id. (imposing PSTN 
restriction) with Permissible Services of U.S.-Licensed International Communications 
Satellite Systems Separate From INTELSAT, 7 FCC Rcd. 2313 (1992) (sunsetting the 
PSTN restriction effective January 1, 1997).  See also In re COMSAT Corp. 
Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 59 (1998) (noting 
that the PTSN restrictions did, in fact, sunset on January 1, 1997), modified on recon., 14 
FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999). 
99  See PanAmSat History Web Page, <http://www.panamsat.com/comp/ 
history.htm>.  In 1996, PanAmSat was acquired by the Hughes Electronics Corporation, 
which is itself 81%-owned by the General Motors Corporation.  Id.  Today, 
Hughes/PanAmSat operates a fleet of 21 geosynchronous satellitesthe largest in the 
world, and two more than INTELSAT.  Id. 
100  See Phillips Satellite Industry Directory, at 17-234, 279-413 (21st ed. 1999) 
(continued . . . ) 
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served the United States.101   Accordingly, in 1998, the FCC found that INTELSAT was 
subject to substantial intramodal competition on most of its U.S.-international routes.102   
 
At the same time, INTELSAT also began to face substantial intermodal 
competition in the market for international communications transmission capacity.   
During the 1990s, the world witnessed a proliferation of high-capacity transoceanic 
submarine fiber optic cables that are capable of delivering many of the same services that 
satellites can deliver, often at lower cost.103  In fact, since the early 1990s, fiber-optic 
cable systems have carried more traffic for U.S.-international switched voice and private 
line than satellite systems have.104  Excluding traffic carried to Mexico and Canada over 
terrestrial networks, markets COMSAT does not serve, fiber-optic cable systems carried 
three times as much switched voice traffic and six times as much private line traffic than 
satellite networks in 1996.105 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(setting forth complete information about each of these satellites and their operators). 
101  See In re Availability of INTELSAT Space Segment Capacity To Users and 
Service Providers Seeking To Access INTELSAT Directly, 15 FCC Rcd. 19160, ¶¶ 2, 5 
(2000). 
102  See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 59 (1998) (A 
number of satellite systems are significant competitors [to INTELSAT] for the full-time 
video and occasional-use video service markets.  These other satellite systems include 
U.S.-based systems, such as PanAmSat and Orion, as well as [foreign-licensed] regional 
satellite service providers.). 
103  See, e.g. In re COMSAT Corp. Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 13 
FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶¶ 11, 19, 32-39 (1998) (COMSAT Non-Dominant Order), modified 
on recon., 14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999) (characterizing satellites and submarine cables as 
fungible commodities serving the markets for switched voice, private line, and video 
services, and noting that cables compete effectively against INTELSAT satellites on 
every major international telecommunications route to or from the United States); see 
also Changes in International Satellite Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the Sen. Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 1999 
WL 170205 (March 25, 1999) (Testimony of INTELSAT Director General Conny 
Kullman) (providing detailed information about various submarine cable and separate 
satellite systems). 
104  COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 56 (1998); see also id. 
¶ 76 (Intermodal competition leads us to believe that fiber-optic cables represent a 
substitute for satellites in the transmission of switched voice service.). 
105  Id. 
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For these and other106 reasons, the FCC in 1998 reclassified COMSAT/ 
INTELSAT as a non-dominant carrier on every major telecommunications route to or 
from the United States.107   By so doing, the FCC found that, with respect to these routes, 
COMSAT lacked market poweri.e., that it possessed neither [c]ontrol of bottleneck 
facilities,108 nor the ability to raise or maintain prices above costs, control prices, or 
exclude competition.109  This reclassification occurred one year before the FCC was to 
implement direct access to INTELSAT.110   Indeed, while COMSATs customers and 
competitors urged the FCC to permit other U.S. providers and users to obtain direct 
access to INTELSAT before non-dominant relief is granted,111 the FCC rejected such 
                                                 
106  The FCC in the COMSAT Non-Dominant Order also stated its expectation that 
INTELSAT would soon face further competition from several Low Earth Orbit satellite 
systems (LEOs), such as Iridium, that were then being deployed.  In theory, LEOs can 
provide many of the same services that GEOs can provide, with the additional benefit of 
mobile use.  In fact, however, Iridiums spectacular failure to attract customers resulted in 
the companys prompt $5 billion bankruptcy.  See Nicole Harris, Iridium to End Satellite 
Service, Liquidate Assets, Mar. 20, 2000, Wall St. J., at B8, 2000 WL-WSJ 3022232.  
Other LEO systems, such as the $4.3 billion GlobalStar, have followed Iridium into 
bankruptcy.  See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, Globalstar's Chapter 11 Filing Reflects Lack of 
Restructuring Plan, Customers, Feb. 19, 2002, Wall St. J., at B6, 2002 WL-WSJ 
3386238. 
107  COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083 (1998), modified on recon., 
14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999).   At the same time, the FCC retained its classification of 
COMSAT as a dominant carrier on a number of minor thin routes, that were not served 
by any cable or satellite provider other than INTELSAT.   These routes primarily 
connected the United States with developing nations located in Africa and Eastern 
Europe as well as low density, remotely located island nations, such as Mauritius and 
New Caledonia, that might not justify the cost of a cable connection.  Id. ¶ 28; see also 
id. App. A (listing INTELSATs thin routes for each product market).  In a subsequent 
Order, the FCC imposed price-cap regulation on COMSATs rates for transmission 
capacity over its remaining thin routes.  Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive 
Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999).   
108  COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 9 (1998). 
109  Id. ¶ 66.  As discussed above, these findings pertained only to COMSATs major 
U.S. international routes, and not to the thin routes served by no other satellite or cable 
service provider.  In 1999, thin route service accounted for less than 8 percent of 
COMSATs INTELSAT-based revenues.  See Policies and Rules for Alternative 
Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999). 
110  Direct access was finally implemented in Direct Access To The INTELSAT 
System, Report & Order, 14 FCC Rcd 15703 (1999) (1999 Direct Access Order).  See 
Subpart V.A, infra. 
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demands.112  Accordingly, the FCC clearly considered INTELSAT to be non-dominant 
in the international telecommunications market at the time it imposed unbundling 
obligations on INTELSAT.  Incumbent cable television system operators, in contrast, 
continue to this day to be dominant in their markets, but are not subject to analogous 
unbundling obligations.113 
 
 
IV. The Introduction of Residential High-Speed Internet Access. 
 In the late 1990s, large numbers of consumers began to seek access to the Internet 
directly from their homes, in order to use the World Wide Web.114  Until 1996, most 
residential users could access the Internet only by dialing up an Internet Service Provider 
(ISP), such as America Online (AOL), via local telephone calls in which digital information 
was translated through analog voice-grade dial-up modems incapable of translating more 
than 56 kilobytes per second (kbps) of information.115   Today, dial-up ISPs that provide 
                                                                                                                                                 
111  See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 17 & n.49 (1998). 
112  See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 180 (1998) (We 
grant Comsat's request for reclassification as a non-dominant common carrier with 
respect to its provision of INTELSAT services in the switched voice, private line, full-
time video, and occasional-use video services to competitive markets. We also find 
Comsat non-dominant in the provision of earth station services); id. ¶ 156 (our action 
today does not require direct access to INTELSAT or a waiver by Comsat of its 
immunity).  Accord 1999 Direct Access Order, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 12 (1999) (same). 
113  See page __, supra (discussing continuing dominance of cable TV in local MVPD 
markets); accord In re Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for 
Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 1244, ¶ 2 (2002) 
(same).  See also page __, infra (discussing continuing dominance of cable modem 
service in local residential high-speed Internet access markets); accord In re Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 2002 WL 407567, 
¶ 9 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (same). 
114  Internet use in the United States has grown at a rate of 20 percent a year since 
1998.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the 
Internet 10 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf>.  As of September 2001, 53.9 
million U.S. households (50.5%) had Internet connections. Id. at 3. 
115  Although some local exchange carriers companies (LECs) offered their own 
proprietary ISP services, these LECs were required, as common carriers, to provide 
transmission services to competing ISPs, and thereby effectively to unbundle their own 
proprietary ISP service from their telephone services.   See Notice of Inquiry Concerning 
(continued . . . ) 
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low-speed narrowband connections to the Internet continue to provide the lions share of 
residential Internet access throughout the United States.116 
 
 Despite the dominant position of narrowband ISP service in the current residential 
ISP market, however, an increasing number of users consider narrowband connections to 
be unsuitable for downloading the data-intensive audiovisual content and applications that 
have proliferated on the World Wide Web.117  Accordingly, new broadband services 
offering high-speed Internet connections to residential subscribers are rapidly gaining in 
popularity.118  At the end of 1999, only 1.8 million Americans were residential subscribers 
to high-speed Internet services.119  By the end of 2000, this number had risen to 6.8 
                                                                                                                                                 
High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, ¶ 6 (2000)  (noting that for dial-up 
Internet access, last mile transmission capability is available independently of the 
choice of ISP).  Partly for this reason, the market for narrowband dial-up ISP service 
was quite competitive nearly from its inception. 
116  As of August 2001, 80% of the nations residential Internet users still obtained 
Internet access via low-speed dial-up service.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, A Nation Online: How Americans 
Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet 2 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf>. 
117  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, at ¶ 10 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (discussing limitations of narrowband 
access and advantages of high-speed access). 
118  See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration, A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use 
of the Internet 2 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf> (noting that [b]etween 
August 2000 and September 2001, residential use of high-speed, broadband service 
doubledfrom about 5 to 11 percent of all individuals, and from 11 to 20 percent of 
Internet users.).  See also Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 
15 FCC Rcd. 19287, ¶¶ 6-7 (2000) (describing transition from dial-up access to high-
speed access).  As a matter of terminology, the FCC defines high-speed transmission 
services to include those services and facilities with a transmission speed of 200 kbps in 
at least one direction.  In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 
Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd. 20913,  ¶ 11 (2000). Advanced telecommunications 
capability and advanced services, in contrast, form a subset of the larger high-speed 
category including only those services and facilities capable of 200 kbps or greater 
transmission in both directions.  Id. (emphasis added). 
119  In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Second Report, 15 FCC 
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million.120   [A]s of June 30, 2001, about 7.8 million households subscribed to high-
speed services, which by then were available to approximately 75-80% of all the homes 
in the United States via DSL or cable modem service.121    By the end of 2002, industry 
analysts project that total U.S. broadband subscribers will rise . . . to over 19 million.122  
By 2008, that number is predicted to reach 78 million.123   
 
At present, high-speed Internet connections are delivered to residential users via 
several competing technological platforms.  In most U.S. locations, incumbent cable 
operators became the first entities to deploy high-speed Internet access to residential users.  
Cable operators were able to do this by upgrading their existing HFC cable facilities to 
offer two-way high-speed data transmission services, with Internet access made possible 
through cable modem technologies.124  Cable Internet connections are very fast, often 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rcd. 20913,  ¶ 8(2) (2000). 
120    Ernie Bergstrom, Mike Paxton, & Michelle Abraham, The Broadband Marathon: 
Access Technologies Jockey for Subscribers (Cahners In-Stat Group Rep. No. MB01-04MI) 
(June 22, 2001), abstracted online at 
<http://www.adsl.com/latestnews/analyst_corner.html>. 
121  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, at ¶ 9 & n.24 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (citing Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, FCC 02-33, CC Docket 98-146, 2002 WL 
186930, at ¶ 7 (rel. Feb 6, 2002)).  In addition, many of the 20-25% of U.S. homes that 
cannot obtain cable modem or DSL service can obtain high-speed Internet access via 
satellite.  See note __, infra. 
122    Ernie Bergstrom, Mike Paxton, & Michelle Abraham, The Broadband Marathon: 
Access Technologies Jockey for Subscribers (Cahners In-Stat Group Rep. No. MB01-04MI) 
(June 22, 2001), abstracted online at 
<http://www.adsl.com/latestnews/analyst_corner.html>. 
123  Deborah A. Lathen, Broadband Today, FCC Staff Report on Industry Monitoring 
Sessions 9 (1999), available online at 
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf> (citing John Schwartz, 
How Much Room in the Fat Pipe?, Sept. 19, 1999, Wash. Post, at H01)). 
124  See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Second Report, 15 FCC 
Rcd. 20913,  ¶ 29 (2000) (Cable modem technologies rely on the same basic network 
architecture used for many years to provide multichannel video service, but with 
upgrades and enhancements to support advanced services.); see also id. ¶ 31 (explaining 
the upgrades needed).   
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providing downstream transmission speeds of up to 1.5 megabytes per second (Mbps) to 
residential users.125  Moreover, in launching high-speed Internet service, cable operators 
realized substantial savings by utilizing the same cable that had already been laid to 
provide cable TV service to reach the homes of high-speed Internet subscribers.126  
 
Unlike incumbent LECs,127 cable operators currently are not legally prohibited 
from having an exclusive relationship with one particular ISP, including an affiliated or 
wholly-owned ISP.128  Accordingly, most cable operators bundled three distinct services 
into a single package collectively marketed as cable modem service: (1) high-speed cable 
transmission of data between the users home and the cable headend; (2) access to the 
Internet through proprietary servers and routers located at the cable headend, plus 
management of the use of the cable network for data delivery services; and (3) browsing 
and e-mail functionalities, some online content (usually including a search engine), and 
                                                 
125  Id. ¶ 33. 
126    In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Second Report, 15 
FCC Rcd. 20913, ¶ 31 (2000) (Once an HFC network is upgraded, new services are 
available to all homes passed by the upgraded infrastructure.  This contrasts with DSL 
technologies, where variations in legacy outside plant conditions can limit access to 
certain end-users even in upgraded areas, and with wireless technologies where line-of-
sight requirements may be a factor.). 
127  See In re Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Third and Fourth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 
20912, ¶ 4 (1999) (Line Sharing Order) (amending unbundling rules to require 
incumbent LECs to provide unbundled access to the high-frequency portion of the local 
loop, in order to enable unaffiliated competitors to provide DSL service through the 
incumbent LECs telephone lines), recon. denied in pertinent part, 16 FCC Rcd. 2101 
(2001), appeal pending sub nom., United States Telecom Association v. FCC, No. 00-
1012 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 18, 2000); see also Appropriate Framework for Broadband 
Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of 
Broadband Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 02-42, CC Docket No. 02-
33, 2002 WL 252714 (rel. Feb. 15, 2002) (initiating proceeding to consider whether DSL 
unbundling requirements should be relaxed to attain regulatory parity with cable modem 
service). 
128  Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, 
¶ 29 (2000).  The FCC did, however, recently initiate a new rulemaking proceeding to 
consider whether it is necessary or appropriate at this time to require that cable operators 
provide unaffiliated ISPs with the right to access cable modem service customers 
directly.  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 72 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002). 
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user support services similar in nature to those offered by other ISPs.129  In short, 
residential cable modem service tends to combine transmission services and ISP services 
into a single bundled package.130   
 
Because very few communities currently enjoy two or more overbuilt HFC cable 
systems,131 very few incumbent cable operators face intramodal competition in the provision 
of high-speed Internet service.  Intermodal competition, however, arose soon after the 
deployment of cable modem service, and is continuing to spread quickly.  As of August 
2001, cable modems continued to serve 68% of the market for residential high-speed 
Internet access, but this market share appears still to be dropping.132 
 
Chief among cables intermodal competitors in the residential high-speed Internet 
access market is asymmetric digital subscriber line service (ADSL or DSL), which is 
                                                 
129  Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, 
¶ 10 (2000). See also In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over 
Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 
00-185, 2002 WL 407567, ¶ 11 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (Cable operators often include in 
their cable modem service offerings all of the services typically provided by Internet 
access providers, so that subscribers usually do not need to contract separately with 
another Internet access provider to obtain discrete services or applications, such as an e-
mail account or connectivity to the Internet, including access to the World Wide Web) 
(footnote omitted).   For present purposes, the FCC defines cable modem service as a 
service that uses cable system facilities to provide residential subscribers with high-speed 
Internet access, as well as many applications or functions that can be used with high-
speed Internet access.  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over 
Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 
00-185, 2002 WL 407567, ¶ 31 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002). 
130  See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. 
Ct. 782, 796-97 n.4 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(Residential high-speed Internet access typically requires two separate steps.  The first is 
transmission from a customer's home to an Internet service providers (ISPs) point of 
presence. This service is generally provided by a cable or phone company over wires 
attached to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights of way.  The second is a service delivered by 
an ISP to provide the connection between its point of presence and the Internet.). 
131  See note __, supra. 
132  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 9 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002); accord U.S. Department of Commerce, 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, A Nation Online: How 
Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet 35 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf>. 
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capable of delivering a 768 kbps download and a 384 kbps upload through reconfigured 
twisted pair copper wires of the existing telephone system.133  Although DSL service has 
been widely deployed by LECs in U.S. metropolitan areas, the service is subject to 
certain technical limitations that currently prevent it from being deployed to some 
potential residential end-users.134  Nonetheless, DSL has already captured 29% of the 
U.S. residential high-speed Internet access market.135  As noted above, unlike cable modem 
providers, most incumbent LECs are required by FCC Rules to unbundle their 
transmission services from their ISP services.136 
 
In addition to cable and DSL (which collectively now control 97% of the residential 
high-speed Internet access market), several other emerging technologies also can deliver 
high-speed Internet data transmissions to residential users.  For example, several terrestrial 
fixed wireless technologies currently enable two-way digital signals to be transmitted 
through the wireless spectrum between a local transmitting tower and a special antenna that 
must be installed on the users rooftop.137  Like cable system operators and unlike 
                                                 
133  See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Zoomtown Web Page, 
<http://company.zoomtown.com/zt_fs.html>. 
134  See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Second Report, 15 FCC 
Rcd. 20913,  ¶¶ 38-40 (2000) (explaining technical reasons why ADSL cannot serve many 
American homes). 
135  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 9 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002).   The NTIA estimates DSLs share of the high-
speed market to be 33%.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration, A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their 
Use of the Internet 35 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf>. 
136  See In re Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Third and Fourth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 
20912, ¶ 4 (1999) (Line Sharing Order), discussed supra note __.  In practice, this 
unbundling requirement enables a user whose DSL line is provided by her local 
telephone company (e.g., Bell Atlantic or BellSouth) to choose to obtain access to the 
Internet through proprietary servers and routers of an unaffiliated ISP (e.g., AOL or 
EarthLink) without also having to pay for the use of the telephone companys servers and 
routers. 
137  See generally In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 
Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd. 20913,  ¶¶ 42-55 (2000) (surveying various fixed wireless 
technologies).   In Chicago, one such fixed wireless service currently provides typical 
downstream transmission speeds of 512 kbps to 1.5 Mbps, with a 256 kbps maximum 
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incumbent LECs, providers of fixed wireless services are not required by law to unbundle 
their transmission services from their ISP services. 
 
High-speed data transmissions also can be delivered to residential users via satellite.  
At present, at least one geostationary satellite system, Hughes DirecPC, can use the 
satellites of its DBS affiliate, DirecTV, to provide 400 kbps downstream transmission to any 
household in the continental United States that has an unobscured line-of-sight to the 
southern sky.138  Moreover, newly developing technologies will use low-earth-orbit 
satellites (LEOs) to offer mobile, two-way communications, at even higher transmission 
speeds than existing technologies.  The most ambitious such system, the Teledesic 
Network, is currently building a proposed 288-satellite system that promises to provide 
millions of simultaneous users with downlink transmission speeds up to 64 Mbps, and 
uplink speeds up to 2 Mbps.139  Like cable system operators and terrestrial fixed wireless 
service providers, but unlike incumbent LECs, satellite providers are not required by law to 
unbundle their transmission services from their ISP services. 
 
In sum, cable modem service emerged as the first entrant into the market for 
residential high-speed Internet access, and therefore briefly enjoyed de facto monopoly 
status in that market.   Because regulators never conceived of residential high-speed Internet 
access as a natural monopoly, however, cable modem service providers have not been 
shielded by law against competition, nor have they been subject to regulation of their rates 
or service offerings or to mandatory unbundling requirements.  
                                                                                                                                                 
upload speed.  See Sprint Broadband Direct Web Page, 
<http://www.sprintbroadband.com/>. 
138  See generally In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 
Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd. 20913,  ¶¶ 56-59 (2000).  Because DBS satellites are not 
equipped for two-way communications, upstream DirecPC transmissions must use 
conventional telephone dial-up connection.  Id. ¶ 58; see also DirecPC Web Page, 
<http://www.direcpc.com/>.  However, newer systems are now beginning to offer two-
way high-speed Internet data transmission (and ISP) services entirely via geostationary 
satellites, without the need for a dial-up uplink.  See, e.g., StarBand Web Page, 
<http://www.starband.com/howitworks/index.htm>.  INTELSAT, in contrast, while 
serving as an important supplier of Internet backbone to many ISPs, does not function as an 
ISP, nor does it use its geostationary satellites to provide any data transmission services 
directly to residential users.  See Intelsat Web Page, 
<http://www.intelsat.int/services_internet.asp>. 
139  Teledesic Web Page, <http://www.teledesic.com/about/about.htm>; see also 
SkyBridge Web Page, <http://www.skybridgesatellite.com/l41_sys/index.htm> (describing 
another proposed LEO system that, beginning in 2005, promises to deliver two-way 
residential service with 5 Mbps downlink transmissions from a constellation of 80 LEO 
satellites). 
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Today, only a minority of cable operators continue to enjoy any de facto monopoly 
in the provision of residential high-speed Internet access.   The majority, in contrast, are now 
subject to intermodal competition, especially from DSL.140   In just two years, these 
intermodal competitors have captured 32% of the still-nascent market.141  On the other hand, 
cable continues to enjoy a number of advantages over its intermodal competitors, including 
both the cost savings that cable operators derive from the incumbency of their existing last 
mile facilities,  and the technological capacity of HFC cable to offer substantially higher 
transmission speeds than competing facilities. 
 
V. Two Controversies Over Access. 
Because local cable television systems and international telecommunications 
satellites each were originally conceived of as natural monopolies, these two seemingly 
dissimilar communications media inspired parallel regulatory responses.  Both types of 
facilities initially enjoyed legal protection against intramodal competition, and were 
protected by circumstances against effective intermodal competition.  Both were initially 
subject to substantial regulation of rates and service offerings.  Neither, however, were 
subject to access or unbundling requirements.   Eventually, in both cases, longstanding 
bans on intramodal competition were lifted, while concurrent technological advances 
enhanced the prospects for effective intermodal competition.   These transitions to 
conditions of competition were accompanied in both cases by relaxation of previously 
applicable rate and service regulation.  Consistent with this transition, when cable modem 
service was introduced by cable operators in the late 1990s, the new service was never 
subject to rate and service regulation or to mandatory unbundling or competitive access  
requirements.  To varying extents, the classical telecommunications paradigm of the 
                                                 
140  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 9 n.25 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (noting that 57.5% of U.S. Zip Codes are 
served by more than one facilities-based provider of residential high-speed Internet access; 
20.3% are served by only one; and 22.2% are served by none). 
141  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 9 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002); accord U.S. Department of Commerce, 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, A Nation Online: How 
Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet 35 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf>.  But see James B. Speta, A 
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 225, 234 
(2002) (asserting that cable modem service has enjoyed a continued and expanding lead 
. . . over its main high-speed competitor, DSL service, at least in residential markets.) 
(emphasis added) (citing law review articles). 
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regulated monopoly gave way to the modern ideal of market competition in the local 
cable and international satellite sectors alike.   
 
A mutual transition from monopoly to competition, however, was not the only 
attribute shared by the local cable television and international satellite 
telecommunications industries.  Rather, the two industries had something else in 
common:  even as they were generally being deregulated, both industries experienced 
parallel controversies over customers or competitors demands for new regulation that 
would require mandatory unbundling of services and facilities.   The first of these 
controversies concerned whether unaffiliated U.S. international common carriers should 
enjoy a legal right to bypass INTELSATs U.S. retail affiliate (COMSAT) and purchase 
raw satellite transmission capacity directly from INTELSAT on the same terms and 
conditions that such capacity could be purchased by COMSAT.   The second controversy 
concerned whether unaffiliated ISPs should enjoy a legal right to bypass the retail cable 
ISP affiliates of facilities-based cable system operators and purchase raw cable 
transmission capacity directly from the cable system operator on the same terms and 
conditions that such capacity could be purchased by the affiliated cable ISP.   The history 
of each of these controversies is discussed in this Part. 
A. The INTELSAT Direct Access Debate. 
Until 1985, non-INTELSAT satellites were not permitted to provide international 
communications services to or from the United States.142   At the same time, 
INTELSATs U.S. affiliate COMSAT143 enjoyed an exclusive franchise over the 
                                                 
142  Cf. Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 
101 F.C.C. 2d 1046 (1985) (Separate Systems Order) (authorizing satellite systems 
separate from INTELSAT to provide international telecommunications service to and 
from the United States), modified on recon., 61 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 649 (1986), further 
recon. denied, 1 FCC Rcd 439 (1986). 
143  The national governments that entered into the INTELSAT Agreement are 
referred to as Parties to the INTELSAT treaty organization.  See Agreement Relating to 
the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization INTELSAT, Art. I, done 
Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813.  The Agreement, however, does not require its member 
state governments to assume an active role in financing or operating the satellite system, 
but instead requires each Party to designate a telecommunications entity, public or 
private, to assume responsibility for financing its countrys share of the satellite system 
and for performing certain commercial operations.  Id. Art. II(b).  These designated 
telecommunications entities, which, until privatization, collectively owned and operated 
the satellite facilities of the INTELSAT system, were known as Signatories to the 
INTELSAT Operating Agreement, a separate commercial agreement signed by the 
Signatories (and not by the State Parties) that established procedures for governing 
INTELSATs commercial operations.   See Operating Agreement Relating to the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, INTELSAT, done Aug. 20, 
1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091.  In the United States, COMSAT Corp., a publicly traded District 
(continued . . . ) 
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provision of INTELSAT satellite space segment capacity  to carriers and users located in 
the United States.144  For these reasons, since at least the 1970s, several U.S. international 
common carriers who were then COMSATs principal customers sought to require 
INTELSAT to unbundle its raw satellite space segment transmission capacity, and to 
sell that space segment capacity to unaffiliated entities on the same terms and conditions 
under which it sold the capacity to COMSAT.145  This proposal for mandatory 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Columbia corporation, was designated as the U.S. Signatory to INTELSAT.  Direct 
Access To The INTELSAT System, Report & Order, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 5 (1999).  
Each Signatorys investment share in INTELSAT was required to remain in proportion to 
its share of the total use of INTELSAT satellite transmission capacity. INTELSAT 
Agreement Art. V(b).  Accordingly, in 1999, when the FCC implemented direct access to 
INTELSAT, COMSATs affiliation with INTELSAT was manifested in its 20.4% 
investment share in INTELSAT, the largest of any Signatory.  COMSAT Corp. 1999 
SEC Form 10-K, at 6 (filed Mar. 30, 2000), online at 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/22698/0000928385-00-001038-index.html>. 
144  Under the FCCs Authorized User I policy (in effect from 1966 to 1984), 
COMSAT was deemed a carriers carrier, authorized to furnish INTELSAT capacity 
only to FCC-designated common carriers, and forbidden from furnishing any INTELSAT 
services or capacity directly to end users except in certain special circumstances.  See 
Authorized User I, 4 F.C.C. 2d 421 (1966).  During the two decades that this policy was 
in effect, however, the FCC recognized an ever-increasing number of such special 
circumstances in which COMSAT could serve non-carrier end users directly.  See, e.g., 
Spanish Int'l Network, 70 F.C.C.2d 2127 (1978) (authorizing COMSAT to provide 
international television program transmission service directly to non-carrier users).  
Finally, in 1984, the FCC formally rescinded the Authorized User I policy, and 
authorized COMSAT to bypass the international common carriers and begin providing 
end-to-end international communications services directly to certain authorized large 
non-carrier end users (such as television broadcast networks).  See Modification of 
Authorized User Policy, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1394 (1982) (Authorized User II), vacated & 
remanded, ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and 
reinstated on remand, 98 F.C.C. 2d 158 (1984).  
Confusingly, the FCC initially characterized its new Authorized User II policy as 
authoriz[ing] non-carrier users to gain direct access to Comsats INTELSAT basic 
transmission services.  Id. ¶ 69. (emphasis added).  This policy, however, should not be 
confused with direct access to INTELSAT, whichunlike the Authorized User II 
policy--authorizes carriers and non-carrier users to bypass COMSAT, and to obtain 
INTELSAT space segment capacity directly from INTELSAT.  See note [n+2], infra.  
During the period from 1984 to 1999 during which the Authorized User II policy was in 
effect but direct access was not, U.S. common carriers could obtain the INTELSAT 
space segment capacity only from COMSAT, as part of a bundled service offering. 
145  See, e.g., In re Application of Communications Satellite Corp. For Authority To 
Provide Satellite Television Services Directly to Users at United States Earth Stations, 76 
(continued . . . ) 
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unbundling of transmission capacity from telecommunications service was denoted 
direct access to INTELSAT.146 
 
Although earlier proposals for direct access had stalled, the issue was revived in 
1982 when the FCC authorized COMSAT, for the first time, to bypass U.S. international 
common carriers  (e.g., AT&T, ITT, Western Union), and to provide end-to-end 
international communications services directly to authorized large non-carrier end 
                                                                                                                                                 
F.C.C. 2d 5, ¶ 6 (1980) (acknowledging that several international common carriers had 
proposed to be allowed direct access to the INTELSAT operations center for the 
purpose of placing orders for television service, or that carriers be allowed to acquire 
satellite facilities on an equal basis with Comsat either on an indefeasible right of user 
basis or by directing that such facilities be provided on a cost-pass-through basis.).  As 
early as 1980, the Commission noted that [t]he issue of direct carrier access to Intelsat is 
not new. . . .  The [carriers] frequently raise the issue of direct access.  Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 
146  See also Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, Report & Order, 14 FCC Rcd 
15703, ¶ 1 (1999) (Direct access refers to the means by which users of the INTELSAT 
satellite system may obtain space segment capacity directly from INTELSAT rather than 
having to go through an INTELSAT Signatory).  When discussing direct access to 
INTELSAT, commentators sometimes use the words unbundling and direct access 
interchangeably. See, e.g., Robert M. Frieden, International Telecommunications and the 
Federal Communications Commission, 21 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 423, 459 (1983) 
(arguing that [t]he Commission must ensure that carriers other than Comsat can secure 
direct and cost-based access to INTELSAT space segment on the same terms and 
conditions that Comsat secures.  Toward that end, Comsat should be directed to unbundle 
the INTELSAT space segment cost from associated earth station services and facilities 
expenses.) (footnote omitted). 
  In fact, INTELSAT offers four different types, or levels, of direct access to 
unaffiliated carriers.  Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 8 
(1999).  This Paper, like the FCCs direct access orders and the ORBIT Act, uses the 
phrase direct access as a term of art to denote the unbundling of INTELSAT space 
segment capacity that INTELSAT formally classifies as Level III Direct Access.  See 
id. ¶¶ 2, 8 (Level 3 direct access permits a customer to enter into a contractual 
agreement with INTELSAT for the purpose of ordering, receiving, and paying for 
INTELSAT space segment capacity at the same rates that INTELSAT charges its 
Signatories.).  For a description of the other types of INTELSAT direct access not at 
issue here, see generally id. ¶ 8 (summarizing Accessing INTELSAT . . . Directly, 
reprinted in Record of Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection on H.R. 1872, 105th Cong., at 135-141, and INTELSAT 
AP-21-E Report by the Board of Governors on INTELSAT Access Arrangements, March 
18, 1997).  See also Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction to 
International Telecommunications Law 74-75 (1996) (same). 
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users (such as television broadcast networks).147   This policy led several major U.S.-
international common carriers to renew their call for direct access to INTELSAT.  
These carriers argued that if COMSAT is permitted to bypass the U.S. carriers in order to 
sell INTELSAT capacity directly to end users, then the U.S. carriers should 
correspondingly be permitted to bypass COMSAT and purchase raw satellite capacity 
directly from INTELSAT on the same terms and conditions as COMSAT.148   To address 
the carriers concerns, the FCC initiated a new Notice of Inquiry on direct access.149  In 
this Notice, the FCC noted that the carriers (and the U.S. Justice Department and 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration) had argued that 
unbundled direct access to INTELSAT would serve the public interest by: 
 
• enhancing price competition among international telecommunications 
carriers by enabling those carriers to compete effectively against 
COMSAT in the market for provision of INTELSAT space segment 
capacity and transmission services to end users;150 
• lowering the price paid by international carriers to acquire INTELSAT 
space segment capacity (causing such savings to be passed through to 
consumers);151 
• guarding against COMSATs using its monopoly INTELSAT role to 
engage in unfair practices (such as predatory underpricing of services 
offered directly to the public) in competitive markets;152 
• permitting (and inspiring) additional carrier investment in INTELSAT 
satellite facilities, and thereby enhancing deployment of such facilities;153 
and 
                                                 
147  Authorized User II, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1394 (1982). 
148  See id. at ¶¶ 100-105.  The international common carriers use the satellite capacity 
to carry international voice and data calls.  
149  See Regulatory Policies Concerning Direct Access to INTELSAT Space Segment 
for the U.S. International Service Carriers, Notice of Inquiry (1982 Direct Access 
NOI), 90 F.C.C. 2d 1446 (1982), dismissed, 97 F.C.C. 2d 296 (1984), dismissal aff'd, 
Western Union Int'l, Inc. v FCC, 804 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
150  Id. ¶¶ 1, 9; see also Regulatory Policies Concerning Direct Access to INTELSAT 
Space Segment for the U.S. International Service Carriers, Report and Order, 97 FCC 2d 
296, ¶¶ 11, 56 (1984) ("1984 Direct Access Order"), aff'd Western Union Int'l, Inc. v 
FCC, 804 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
151  1982 Direct Access NOI, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1446, ¶ 2 (1982). 
152  Id. ¶¶ 7, 12-13; see also 1984 Direct Access Order, 97 FCC 2d 296, ¶¶ 12, 56 
(1984). 
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• fostering innovation and efficiency in the provision of international 
communications services.154 
As discussed in Part V, infra, these arguments advanced in the early 1980s in 
favor of carrier direct access to INTELSAT are substantially similar to the arguments 
currently being advanced in favor of ISP open access to HFC cable capacity used for 
high-speed data transmission. 
 
In 1984, the FCC terminated the 1982 direct access proceeding after concluding 
that proponents of direct access have failed to establish that it will serve the public 
interest.155  At that time, the Commission was unpersuaded that, whatever benefits are 
to be derived, they would be so substantial as to outweigh the adverse consequences 
which are likely to attend the adoption and implementation of direct access.156  
Specifically, the Commission concluded, inter alia, that: 
 
• Neither INTELSATs underlying costs of operating and maintaining the 
global satellite system nor the corresponding wholesale IUC rates that it 
charged would likely be affected by the implementation of direct access 
in the United States.157   
                                                                                                                                                 
153  1982 Direct Access NOI, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1446, ¶ 8 (1982); see also 1984 Direct 
Access Order, 97 FCC 2d 296, ¶¶ 14-15 (1984). 
154  1982 Direct Access NOI, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1446, ¶ 9. 
155  1984 Direct Access Order, 97 FCC 2d 296, ¶ 3 (1984).  The Commission issued 
the 1984 Direct Access Order shortly after the D.C. Circuit court ordered it to conclude  
its still-open 1982 direct access proceeding.  See ITT World Communications, Inc. v. 
FCC, 725 F.2d 732, 754-55 (D.C. Cir.1984) (affirming the FCCs Authorized User II 
Order, but directing the FCC to give due consideration to the carriers requests for direct 
access to INTELSAT). 
156  1984 Direct Access Order, 97 FCC 2d 296, ¶ 3 (1984); see also id. ¶ 32 
(concluding that carrier direct access to INTELSAT would not produce significant 
economic savings to carriers or users). 
157  1984 Direct Access Order, 97 FCC 2d 296, ¶¶ 40, 44 (1984).  INTELSATs 
wholesale charges for use of raw satellite transmission capacity are termed 
INTELSAT Utilization Charges (IUCs).  The IUC serves as a measure, expressed 
on a per-circuit basis, of the costs INTELSAT incurs in constructing and operating the 
global satellite system. Id. ¶ 34. The level of the IUC is set so as to recover 
amortization of capital (depreciation expense), the operating expenses of the INTELSAT 
system and compensation to Signatories for the use of their capital.  Id.  The IUC does 
not reflect the local internal costs of connecting a carrier or user to an INTELSAT 
satellite circuit.  Id. 
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• COMSATs costs of administering INTELSAT programs and establishing 
INTELSAT circuit connectivities in the United Stateswhich were not 
recovered in INTELSATs wholesale IUC rateswould not be avoided by 
implementation of direct access, and would need to be recovered 
elsewhere.158 
• Because even COMSATs new end-to-end service would furnish only 
the communications link from a U.S. earth station to an INTELSAT 
satellitebut would not supply the terrestrial end-links between the earth 
station and the end users premisesCOMSAT did not enjoy any 
intramodal competitive advantage over U.S. carriers.159    
• Because transoceanic submarine cables were capable of providing many 
of the same services that INTELSAT could provide, and at lower prices, 
COMSAT was always subject to intermodal competition.160 
                                                 
158  Id. ¶¶ 44-47.  Such costs include COMSATs return on its satellite investment; 
the income tax Comsat is obligated to pay on that return; and Comsat's internal 
operations and maintenance, research and development, and corporate headquarters 
expenses.  Id. ¶ 44.  With respect to such costs, the Commission concluded in 1984 that 
were we to adopt direct access, we would merely be changing the form in which these 
expenses would be recovered and, in the process, adding an unnecessary layer of 
regulation with its attendant costs.  Id. ¶ 50. 
159  Id. ¶ 58.  Specifically, the FCC concluded that although the U.S. common carriers 
might be competitively disadvantaged in having to obtain the earth-station-to-satellite 
link from COMSAT at retail price, the carriers possessed a compensating competitive 
advantage in consequence of being able to furnish terrestrial ground-links to end users, 
which COMSAT could not supply.  Id.  Stated differently, the Commission concluded 
that the carriers ability to offer retail one-stop-shopping to end users for a panoply of 
international satellite communications services provided effective competition to 
COMSATs ability to obtain a single network element of such service (the satellite link) 
at the wholesale IUC rate.  See id. at ¶¶ 58-62 (providing examples in which end users 
preferred to take seamless end-to-end service from a non-COMSAT carrier). 
160  Id. ¶¶ 63-64.  In 1984, the communications behemoth AT&T owned virtually all 
transoceanic submarine cables to or from the United States, while also utilizing 90% of 
the INTELSAT space segment capacity then leased to U.S. carriers.  Id. ¶ 64.  In 
consequence of this fact, the FCC noted that the effect on intermodal competition of . . . 
direct access . . . would depend to a significant degree on the behavior of AT&T.  Id.  
While the Commission could not predict exactly what AT&T (which opposed direct 
access to INTELSAT) would actually do, it did note that under a direct access regime, 
AT&T could in effect control investment decisions relating to INTELSAT space 
segment, by and large removing that function from Comsat. Such a development could be 
detrimental to the promotion of intermodal competition, insofar as AT&T could bias 
investment and circuit utilization decisions in favor of one medium over the other.  Id. 
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• Even assuming that direct access would produce savings for carriers, and 
that these savings would be passed-through dollar-for-dollar by carriers to 
end-users, such savings would be imperceptible to end-users, because they 
would not constitute more than a few percentage points of the total end-
user charge.161 
Notably, because it found that direct access to INTELSAT would not serve the 
public interest, the 1984 Direct Access Order did not resolve whether the FCC possessed 
legal authority to implement direct access to INTELSAT.162    
 
The issue of direct access to INTELSAT next resurfaced in the mid-1990s, 
when COMSAT petitioned the FCC for reclassification as a non-dominant carrier.163  By 
that time, as discussed in Part III.B, supra, several U.S. separate satellite systems 
provide[d] service to many foreign nations.164  Moreover, the early 1990s saw an 
unprecedented deployment of transoceanic submarine cables capable of providing many 
of the same services that INTELSAT provides, at  lower cost.165  In response to 
                                                 
161  Id. ¶¶ 66-67.  In 1984, COMSAT obtained raw space segment capacity from 
INTELSAT at an IUC rate of $390 per circuit per month, and incurred a total cost 
(including expenses) of $800 per circuit per month to obtain such capacity.  Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.  
COMSAT then leased these circuits to U.S. carriers and users at a rate of $1125 per 
circuit per month, a rate designed to recover both its cost of obtaining the INTELSAT 
space segment capacity, and its additional cost of operating its proprietary earth station 
facilities, which receive the INTELSAT signals.  Id.  After taking possession of the 
signals at the COMSAT earth station, the domestic carriers used their own terrestrial 
facilities to transmit the signal to the premises of end-users located in the United States.  
Id. ¶ 66.  The typical carrier charge [to an end-user] for a voice-grade (telephone) end-
to-end service is approximately $4,000 per channel per month.  Id.  Based on these 
figures, the FCC concluded that end-users would receive only a minimal benefit even if 
the carriers could obtain raw INTELSAT space segment capacity at a price closer to the 
IUC.  Id. 
162  See id. at ¶¶ 27-29 (summarizing arguments advanced by COMSAT that direct 
access was prohibited by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, but declining to 
address such arguments).  In affirming the 1984 Direct Access Order, the D.C. Circuit 
endorsed the FCCs policy conclusions, and likewise declined to address whether the 
Commission would have had legal authority to require direct access had it desired to do 
so.  See Western Union Intl, Inc. v. FCC, 804 F.2d 1280, 1285-87 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
163  See In re COMSAT Corp. Petition for Reclassification as a Non-Dominant 
Carrier, 13 FCC Rcd 14083 (1998) (COMSAT Non-Dominant Order), supplemented, 
Policies & Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of COMSAT Corp., 14 FCC 
Rcd 3065 (1999). 
164  Id. ¶ 11. 
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COMSATs petition, several of COMSATs customers and competitors commented that 
COMSAT should be reclassified as non-dominant only in connection with the 
implementation of direct access to INTELSAT in the United States.166  
 
Without implementing direct access, the COMSAT Non-Dominant Order granted 
COMSATs request for reclassification as a non-dominant carrier on every international 
route over which INTELSAT was subject to facilities-based competition.167  At the same 
time, however, the Order called upon COMSAT to voluntarily allow direct access to 
INTELSAT on the few remaining non-competitive thin routes not served by any 
satellite or cable other than INTELSAT.168  According to the Order, permitting 
unaffiliated carriers and users to obtain direct access to INTELSAT on the 
noncompetitive U.S. international routes would serve the public interest by: 
 
• reducing COMSATs control in the U.S. over the supply of INTELSAT 
satellite capacity serving non-competitive markets, and thereby reducing 
COMSATs market power in these markets; 
                                                                                                                                                 
165  Id. 
166  Id. ¶ 17 & n.49.  The repeated efforts of COMSATs customers and competitors 
to raise the issue of direct access to INTELSAT in the context of FCC regulatory 
proceedings initiated by COMSAT parallels the similar efforts of cable ISP customers 
and competitors to raise the cable open access issue in the context of FCC (and local 
government) regulatory proceedings (such as the proceedings seeking regulatory 
approval of the AT&T/TCI Cable merger and the AOL/Time Warner merger) initiated by 
the cable companies.  In both situations, access proponents have argued that the 
regulatory result sought by the respective applicants should be granted only if 
conditioned on the pertinent access requirement.  See note __, infra (discussing cable 
open access debates that arose in the FCCs proceedings on the AT&T/TCI, 
AT&T/MediaOne, and AOL/Time Warner mergers). 
167  Specifically, the COMSAT Non-Dominant Order reclassified COMSAT as a non-
dominant telecommunications communications carrier in the switched-voice, private-line, 
and occasional-use video markets on every major route to or from the United States.  
COMSAT was not, however, reclassified as non-dominant of the few remaining thin 
routes not served by any other satellite system or submarine cable.  On those routes 
(which accounted for about 7% of COMSATs INTELSAT revenues in 1999), COMSAT 
remains subject to dominant carrier tariffing requirements and price-cap rate regulation.  
See Policies & Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of COMSAT Corp., 14 
FCC Rcd 3065 (1999) (Thin Route Order) (setting forth the FCCs regulatory policies 
concerning COMSATs remaining thin routes). 
168  See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14083, ¶¶ 155-56 (1998). 
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• affording U.S. international carriers and users a choice between using 
Comsat or accessing INTELSAT directly to serve the non-competitive 
markets; 
• spurring competition among telecommunications service providers, and 
thereby promoting competitive market conditions in markets that were 
then non-competitive; and 
• creating the potential for price competition, service quality improvements 
and innovation.169 
 The COMSAT Non-Dominant Order did not discuss any public interest benefits 
that might accrue if direct access to INTELSAT were implemented on the competitive 
routes that accounted for 93% of COMSATs INTELSAT revenues,  Nonetheless, a new 
rulemaking proceeding was soon initiated to reconsider implementing direct access to 
INTELSAT, without limitation to noncompetitive routes.170  One year later, after decades 
of resisting similar proposals, the Commission adopted its latest direct access proposal.171   
Finally, on March 17, 2000, Congress enacted the comprehensive ORBIT Act, which 
codified the 1999 Direct Access Order by expressly providing for direct access to 
INTELSAT in the United States.172  Today, the FCC continues to play an active role in the 
                                                 
169  Id. ¶ 155. 
170  Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 
FCC Rcd 22013 (1998).  The FCC announced its intention to initiate this new rulemaking 
proceeding in the COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14083, ¶¶ 156-57 (1998).  
In so doing, it noted that in 1984 (when the FCC had earlier declined to adopt direct 
access to INTELSAT in the United States), direct access to INTELSAT had not been 
implemented anywhere on earth, and INTELSAT then had no procedures for 
implementing it.  In 1992, however, INTELSAT introduced new procedures for gaining 
direct access to INTELSAT satellites by non-Signatory carriers and users.  1999 Direct 
Access Order, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 8 (1999).  By 1998, when COMSAT was 
reclassified as non-dominant, direct access to INTELSAT had been adopted in 76 foreign 
countries, including the United Kingdom.  COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
14083, ¶ 157 (1998). 
171  Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, Report & Order, 14 FCC Rcd 15703 
(1999) (1999 Direct Access Order). 
172  See Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International 
Telecommunications (ORBIT) Act § 641(a), Pub. L. No. 106-180 § 641(a), 114 Stat. 48, 
55 (2000), codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 765(a) (Supp. 2001) (providing that users or 
providers of telecommunications services shall be permitted to obtain direct access to 
INTELSAT telecommunications services and space segment capacity through purchases 
of such capacity or services from INTELSAT.).  Section 641(a) of ORBIT did nothing 
more than codify the FCCs 1999 Direct Access Order (which had been issued six 
months earlier).  However, both Congress and the FCC considered enactment of the 
(continued . . . ) 
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transition to direct access to INTELSAT.  Indeed, the Commission is currently 
considering a proposal to abrogate some of INTELSATs existing contractual capacity 
obligations in order to free up more capacity for direct access users.173 
 
B. The Cable Open Access Debate 
Before residential cable modem service was deployed in 1998, most residential 
users had no means of obtaining Internet access from their homes other than via 
traditional dial-up telephone services provided by local exchange carriers (LECs) over 
copper telephone lines.174  In those days, most LECs enjoyed monopolies over the 
provision of dial-tone service to their customers homes.  Because, however, LECs were 
required by law to unbundle dial-tone (transportation) service from ISP service, the 
LECs monopoly over dial-tone service did not extend into the ISP market.175  Rather, 
these unbundling requirements provided residential consumers with a choice of whether to 
take ISP service from an ISP affiliated with their LEC, or through a competing unaffiliated 
ISP.176 
 
The legal obligation of LECs to unbundle their transportation services from their ISP 
services derived from several sources.  First, as regulated public utility corporations, LECs 
had never been permitted to deny telephone service to anyone willing to pay, including a 
potential competitor.177  Thus, LECs could not prevent unaffiliated ISPs from obtaining 
                                                                                                                                                 
provision to be necessary because COMSATs petition for review of the 1999 Direct 
Access Order, which was then pending before the D.C. Circuit, raised substantial 
questions about the Commissions legal authority under the Communications Satellite 
Act of 1962 to implement direct access unilaterally.  To resolve these questions, the 
direct access provision was attached to the comprehensive ORBIT Act, whose main 
provisions mandated a mechanism for privatization of INTELSAT and Inmarsat.   
173  See In re Availability of INTELSAT Space Segment Capacity To Users and 
Service Providers Seeking To Access INTELSAT Directly, 15 FCC Rcd. 19160, ¶¶ 2, 5 
(2000) (INTELSAT Capacity Order). 
174  Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, 
¶ 6 (2000). 
175  See Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 
19287, ¶ 6 (2000).  ISP service differs from transportation service; [i]n general, ISPs 
receive communications from their customers computers and route the communications 
to other computers connected either to their networks or other networks.  Id. ¶ 9. 
176  See id. 
177  See, e.g., North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 F. 837, 844 
(4th Cir. 1922), cert. dismissed, 263 U.S. 508 (1924) (when a [public utility] corporation 
(continued . . . ) 
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telephone numbers.  Similarly, as regulated public utility corporations, LECs could not 
require a consumer to purchase an unregulated service in order to obtain the regulated 
service.178  This longstanding regulatory doctrine foreclosed the LECs from bundling an 
affiliated ISP service with their standard local calling service, and requiring consumers to 
take both or neither.  
 
In addition, certain provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that were 
designed to jumpstart competition in local calling markets now require most LECs to 
unbundle and sell to their competitors whatever new capabilities they add to their 
networks at rates based on the cost[s] of providing them.179  Accordingly, [b]y virtue 
of the local competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, [incumbent 
LECs now] must grant unbundled access to competing carriers seeking to provide DSL 
service.180   In addition, [a] cluster of FCC rules that survived the passage of the 1996 
Act similarly entitles unaffiliated [ISPs] to request interconnection and unbundled sale of 
network elements from the largest ILECs for the purpose of providing DSL service.181 
                                                                                                                                                 
has definitely undertaken and entered upon a particular service authorized by a charter . . 
., the obligation to perform the service is complete, its rates and terms are subject to 
regulation by public authority, and it must serve all alike.  In such public service it cannot 
pick and choose its customers.).  The traditional duties of telecommunications common 
carriers to interconnect and to provide service to their competitors at just and reasonable 
rates is reflected in the Communications Act of 1934, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203-205. 
178  This result derived from longstanding regulatory doctrines which barred public 
utility corporations from bundling regulated monopoly services with services also 
available from competitors.  See, e.g., Hicks v. City of Monroe Utilities Commn, 112 
So.2d 635, 647 (La. 1959) (a public utility corporation[] cannot refuse to render the 
service which it is authorized by its charter to furnish because [of a customer's refusal to 
purchase a different service] . . .  Each kind of service must be furnished on its own 
merits and no discrimination is permitted against a customer for one service because he 
does not desire another service); Seaton Mountain Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. 
Idaho Springs Inv. Co., 111 P. 834, 835-46 (Colo. 1910) (public utility corporation could 
not condition its provision of steam service on customer's additional purchase of electric 
service). 
179  Peter W. Huber, Michael W. Kellogg, & John Thorne, Federal 
Telecommunications Law § 11.9.2, at 1070 (2d ed. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) and 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i)). 
180  Jim Chen, The Authority To Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 677, 680 & n.18 (2001) (citing FCC Orders implementing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 251(c)(3)). 
181    Id. at 680-81 & n.19 (citing FCC Orders and a treatise).  See generally Peter W. 
Huber, Michael W. Kellogg, & John Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law §§ 
12.5.2-.3, at 1097-1103 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the significance and ongoing vitality of 
(continued . . . ) 
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 Thus, both the legacy of public utility regulation and the local competition 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 have brought open access (i.e. 
unbundling) regulatory requirements to all forms of Internet access delivered to 
residential users by telephone wires, from narrowband to DSL.182  At the same time, 
the separate legacy of cable television regulation (including the modern trend towards 
cable television deregulation) has enabled cable modem service providers to avoid being 
subject to similar requirements.183  Unlike incumbent LECs offering dial-up or high-
speed DSL service, cable operators currently are not legally prohibited from having an 
exclusive relationship with one particular ISP, including an affiliated or wholly-owned 
ISP.184  Primarily because of these legacy-based regulatory distinctions, cable modem 
service providers are now immune from unbundling and access requirements that apply 
to DSL service providers, even though the two services are fungible to the consumer.185 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Expanded Interconnection and Open Network Architecture rules); James B. 
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 39, 67-69 (2000) (detailing the legal obligation 
of ILECs to deal with competing DSL carriers). 
182  See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireline Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 02-42, CC Docket No. 02-33, 2002 WL 252714, ¶¶ 6-7 
(Wireline Broadband NPRM) (rel. Feb. 15, 2002), reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 9232 (Feb. 
28, 2002). 
183  See generally Rosemary Harold, Cable-Based Internet Access: Exorcising the 
Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev 721 (2001) (discussing how 
telephonys legacy of common carrier interconnection and access requirements, and cable 
televisions historical lack thereof, have contributed to the divergence between the 
respective access requirements now applied to DSL and cable ISPs); see also See In re 
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 
Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
FCC 02-42, CC Docket No. 02-33, 2002 WL 252714, ¶ 6 (Wireline Broadband NPRM) 
(rel. Feb. 15, 2002) (Legacy regulations were based on technical and market 
assumptions concerning [cable and telephone] networks and the services they 
delivered.), reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 9232 (Feb. 28, 2002).  
184  Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, 
¶ 29 (2000).  Like cable television service, neither fixed wireless telecommunications 
services nor DBS television service have a legacy of common carrier regulation.  
Accordingly, like cable but unlike DSL, residential ISP service using terrestrial or satellite 
wireless high-speed transmission technologies are not subject to open access or 
unbundling requirements. 
185  See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireline Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Notice of 
(continued . . . ) 
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Because of the apparent arbitrariness of the distinction, many unaffiliated ISPs 
and some public interest groups have advocated  that cable systems offering high-speed 
data transmission services should be subject to an open access requirement similar to 
the common carrier regime under Title II of the Communications Act, which would 
require cable operators who offer high-speed data transmission services to grant 
unaffiliated ISPs non-discriminatory access to their cable plant.186  These groups 
argued that broadband service over cable lines is essentially common carriage, and 
moving bits between an ISP and a consumer is essentially a transmission service.187  
Cable open access proponents have also asserted that an open access requirement 
would speed deployment of high-speed Internet service to the residential market and 
produce other competitive benefits;188 protect the end-to-end architecture of the 
Internet;189 or that mandatory unbundling cable ISP services from cable transportation 
services is needed to forestall future regulation of both of those services.190  
                                                                                                                                                 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 02-42, CC Docket No. 02-33, 2002 WL 252714, ¶ 7 
(Wireline Broadband NPRM) (rel. Feb. 15, 2002) (recognizing that legacy regulation 
has led to divergent regulatory requirements now being applied to cable modem and DSL 
service despite the fact that these two platforms provide substantially the same service to 
the consumer), reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 9232 (Feb. 28, 2002). 
186  Deborah A. Lathen, Broadband Today, FCC Staff Report on Industry Monitoring 
Sessions 36 (1999), available online at 
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf>. 
187  Id.; accord James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race For the Last Mile?  A 
Critique of Open Access Rules For Broadband Platforms, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 39, 78 
(2000) (The arguments for open access . . . have a strong pedigree in the history of 
telecommunications regulation, which has long been concerned that dominant telephone 
companies will use their control over transport facilities to act anti-competitively against 
computer companies or other information service providers.). 
188  See Part IV.A-IV.B, infra (discussing debates over whether access requirements 
spur competition and deployment). 
189  See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 971 (2001). 
190  See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 971 (2001) 
(asserting that if we let natural monopoly services be bundled together with potentially 
competitive services, we will end up having to regulate not only the monopoly services 
but the competitive ones as well.  . . . [Ironically], to allow cable companies to tie their 
natural monopoly service to a competitive one . . . will lead in the end to more regulation, 
and what is worse, to unnecessary regulation.). 
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Similarly, most LECs also argue for regulatory parity between cable and DSL.191  
Unlike the unaffiliated ISPs, however, the LECs suggest that regulatory parity should be 
achieved not by imposing open access on cable ISPs, but instead by eliminating the 
open access and unbundling requirements that currently apply to DSL.192 
 
 In response to the arguments advanced by cable open access proponents, some 
local governments attempted to impose open access requirements upon cable television 
franchisees in connection with transfers or renewals of their franchises.193  To date, 
however, the two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals that have reviewed such local 
ordinances both held the entire field to be preempted by federal law.194  At the same time, 
however, these two circuit courts both opined that the federal law at issue vested the FCC 
with authority either to require cable open access or to prohibit it, and that the FCC had 
                                                 
191  See, e.g., Comments of SBC Corp. and BellSouth Corp filed in FCC GEN Docket 
No. 00-185, at i (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (asserting that like services must be treated alike, 
regardless of the name, corporate history, or traditional lines-of-business of the service 
provider.  Broadband Internet access is the same service, whether it is provided over 
coax, over copper, or through the air.). 
192    See, e.g., id. at iii (Incumbent LECs should stand on equal footing with other 
[high-speed transmission] service providers, . . . [who] cannot be compelled to provide 
broadband on a common carrier basis. . . .  [T]he enormous regulatory scaffold that the 
Commission has built up around incumbent LEC xDSL offerings must be dismantled.). 
193  See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable 
and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 FCC. Rcd. 19287, ¶ 13 & nn.25-29 (2000) 
(discussing several such attempts). 
194  See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 257 F.3d 356, 359, 363-64 
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that local open access laws are preempted by Section 
621(b)(3)(D) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, as amended by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D)); AT&T Corp. v. City of 
Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). 
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not exercised this authority one way or the other.195  In so holding, these courts returned 
the cable open access debate squarely to the doorstep of the FCC.196  
 
 Despite (or perhaps because of) the intensity of the controversy, however, the 
FCC thus far has assiduously avoided deciding whether or not cable modem service 
providers should be required to unbundle high-speed data transmission services from ISP 
services, or to provide transmission services to unaffiliated ISPs on nondiscriminatory 
terms and conditions.  Indeed, for years, the FCC refused even to rule on the threshold 
regulatory question whether the transmission component of cable modem service is 
properly characterized as a cable service, an information service, a 
telecommunications service, or some combination thereof.197   Even while this 
threshold question remained unsettled, however, the Commission was forced to 
adjudicate several ad hoc demands for attachment of cable open access conditions that 
arose during proceedings in which the Commissions regulatory approval was needed for 
several large individual cable mergers to proceed.  The results of these merger 
proceedings were inconsistent, however: [t]he FCC rejected calls for open access in the 
AT&T/TCI and AT&T/Media One merger decisions, but both the FTC and the FCC 
imposed open access rules on the AOL/Time Warner merger.198 
                                                 
195  See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 257 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 
2001) (although local governments are preempted from requiring cable open access, the 
merits of open access are not before us.  . . .  For the time being, therefore, we are content 
to leave these issues to the expertise of the FCC.); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 
F.3d 871, 879-880 (9th Cir. 2000) (Thus far, the FCC has not subjected cable broadband 
to any regulation, including common carrier telecommunications regulation. . . .  
Congress has reposed the details of telecommunications policy in the FCC, and we will 
not impinge on its authority over these matters.). 
196  Cf. GTE.Net LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 185 F.Supp.2d 1141 (S.D. Cal. 
2002) (invoking doctrine of primary jurisdiction to defer decision to FCC on whether 
cable open access is mandated by Communications Act). 
197  See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 
122 S. Ct. 782, 797-98 & n.4-6 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (surveying history of FCCs refusal to classify the service that is provided by cable 
transmission of data between customers home and ISPs point-of-presence on the 
Internet) (citing FCC Orders, FCC amicus briefs in circuit court cases, and FCC petition 
for certiorari in Gulf Power Co. case); see also Rosemary Harold, Cable-Based Internet 
Access: Exorcising the Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev 721, 728 
(2001) (noting the court decisions spawned by the agencys deliberate inaction in 
refusing to adopt a classification). 
198  James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 
Fed. Comm. L.J. 225, 234 (2002).  See also In re AOL Time Warner Inc., 16 FCC Rcd. 
6547, ¶¶ 17-18 (2001) (requiring the merging parties, inter alia, to afford access to Time 
Warner's cable plant to unaffiliated ISPs . . . and to hold separate Road Runner, [Time 
(continued . . . ) 
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 Finally, on March 15, 2002, the FCC classified the transmission component of 
cable modem service as an information service.199  In so doing, the FCC did not 
immediately implement cable open access, nor did it disclaim any authority or intention 
to do so.  Instead, by classifying every aspect of cable modem service as an information 
service the FCC effectively protected its own future discretion to adoptor not to 
adoptcable open access.200  Had the Commission classified the transmission 
                                                                                                                                                 
Warners affiliated] cable ISP, from AOLs ISP service until AOL Time Warner offers an 
unaffiliated ISP on all AOL Time Warner cable systems).  But compare Transfer of 
Control of Licenses From Tele-Communications, Inc. To AT&T Corp., 14 FCC Rcd. 
3160, ¶ 96 (1999) (refusing to impose cable modem open access as a condition of 
approving the AT&T/TCI merger); Transfer of Control of Licenses From MediaOne 
Group, Inc. to AT&T Corp., 15 FCC Rcd. 9816, ¶¶ 126-28 (2000) (refusing to impose 
cable modem open access as a condition of approving the AT&T/MediaOne merger), 
recon. denied, 16 FCC Rcd. 5610 (2001), compliance deadlines suspended, 16 FCC Rcd. 
5835 (2001), recon. denied, 16 FCC Rcd. 20587 (2001); but see id. ¶¶ 120-21 (noting 
that AT&T/MediaOne had committed to voluntarily open its cable modem platform to 
unaffiliated ISPs by June 2002, and to offer reasonably comparable access prices to 
unaffiliated ISPs). 
199  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002).   The Telecommunications Act of 1996 defines 
information service as the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, 
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of 
any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications 
system or the management of a telecommunications service.  47 U.S.C. § 153(20); see 
also High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 2002 WL 407567, at ¶ 34 n.139 
(rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (tracing etymology of the information services concept).  In 1999, 
the FCC had already classified the ISP component of cable modem service as an 
information service. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf 
Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782, 796-97 n.4 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, 15 FCC Rcd. 385, 401 (1999), vacated in part in other 
respects, WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and otherwise affd, 
Association of Communications Enterprises v. FCC, 253 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).  The 
ISP component of cable modem service is the component in which data is transferred 
from the providers point-of-presence at the cable headend through a portal and onto the 
Internet.  See id. 
200  Interestingly, some commentators in the cable modem rulemaking proceeding had 
expressly proposed that [t]he Commissions decision of how to classify cable modem 
service . . . should be outcome-oriented: the Commission has substantial discretion in 
(continued . . . ) 
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component of cable modem service as a telecommunications service rather than an 
information service, it might have been required to implementation cable open access, 
because telecommunications carriers are generally subject to common carrier regulation 
and unbundling requirements.201  Conversely, classifying cable modem service as a cable 
service would likely have prohibited the FCC from implementing cable open access, 
while simultaneously empowering local cable franchising authorities to do so.202 
 
 In contrast, the Communications Act neither requires nor clearly prohibits the 
FCC from requiring unbundling of information services.203   Accordingly, in the same 
                                                                                                                                                 
how to classify the service and should thus consider the effect of its decision on 
competition in the broadband marketplace and the options it reserves for itself in the 
future.  Comments of the Competition Policy Institute filed In re Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN 
Docket No. 00-185, at 1-2 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (responding to NOI published at 15 FCC. 
Rcd. 19287 (2000)).  Although the classification of cable modem services as 
information services did in fact maximize the Commissions reservation of power to 
exercise future discretion, Chairman Powell specifically disclaimed that the classification 
was the product of result-oriented decision-making. See In re Inquiry Concerning High-
Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & 
NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (Separate Statement of 
Chairman Powell) (The Commission is not permitted to look at the consequences of 
different definitions and then choose the label that comports with its preferred regulatory 
treatment. That would be contrary to law. The Commission must apply the definition and 
then accept the regulatory regime that adheres to that classification and that which 
Congress chose when it adopted the statute.). 
201  See Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet, 15 FCC Rcd. 
19287, ¶ 20 (2000) (noting that the Communications Act imposes a wide variety of 
obligations on telecommunications carriers, including requirements relating to 
interconnection, universal service contributions, disabilities access, and privacy of 
subscriber information.).  On the other hand, the FCC has broad authority to forbear 
from enforcing the telecommunications provisions if it determines that such action is 
unnecessary to prevent discrimination and protect consumers, and is consistent with the 
public interest.  AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)).  Therefore, classifying the transmission component of cable 
modem service as a telecommunications service would likely only have established a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of cable open access. 
202  See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876-78 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the regulatory consequences of classifying cable modem service as a cable 
service).    
203  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, at ¶¶ 75-79 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002).  See also Part VI.C, infra (discussing 
(continued . . . ) 
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order in which it adopted the classification, the FCC simultaneously launched a new 
rulemaking proceeding to consider the merits of whether it is necessary or appropriate at 
this time to require that cable operators provide unaffiliated ISPs with the right to access 
cable modem service customers directly. . . .204 
 
VI. Cable Open Access vs. Direct Access To INTELSAT in Comparative Perspective 
The arguments for and against cable open access, discussed in Part V.B, above, 
center around four relatively uncontroversial policy goals.  These include:  (1) 
encouraging deployment of facilities that provide advanced services to the widest 
possible spectrum of Americans; (2) encouraging competition among providers of 
broadband service; [and] (3) maintaining neutrality among the technologies that provide 
broadband Internet services.205  While these policy goals, stated abstractly, are not 
controversial, the question of whether cable open access will contribute to their 
achievement has generated substantial controversy.206  As discussed in Part V.A, above, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the FCCs statutory authority to require unbundling of information services).  
204  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 72 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002), petitions for review pending sub nom., 
EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, Docket No. 02-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 26, 1997).  In this new 
rulemaking proceeding, the Commission continued to solicit reasons why the 
Commission might lack legal authority to implement cable open access.  See id. ¶¶ 72, 79 
(soliciting further comment on the scope of the FCCs statutory authority to implement 
direct access); id. ¶¶ 80-82 (soliciting comment on possible constitutional limitations on 
the FCCs authority to implement direct access).  The Commission also made clear, 
however, that it is now ready to consider the substantive merits of implementing such a 
policy See id. ¶ 73 (setting forth substantive considerations which the FCC seeks 
comment on). 
205  Comments of the Competition Policy Institute filed In re Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN 
Docket No. 00-185, at 2 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (responding to NOI published at 15 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 19287 (2000)).  The Competition Policy Institute also notes a fourth policy goal of 
removing regulation where the public interest is served by that action.  Id.  A general 
presumption favoring deregulation would, of course, weigh against regulatory imposition 
of either cable open access or INTELSAT direct access.  However, because this policy 
goal would not appear to provide a basis for comparison between cable open access and 
INTELSAT direct access, it is not discussed herein. 
206  More than 300 public Comments and Reply Comments were filed in response to 
the FCCs Notice of Inquiry concerning cable open access.  See In re Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 FCC 
Rcd. 19287, GEN Docket No. 00-185 (rel. Sept. 28, 2000).  
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the debate over open access to INTELSAT has revolved around substantially the same 
policy issues, and has generated substantially similar controversies concerning the 
efficacy of access regulation in advancing these goals.  This Part compares the efficacy of 
cable open access with the efficacy of INTELSAT direct access in achieving each of 
these goals.   
 
A. Encouraging Deployment of Facilities. 
Since 1934, it has been the policy of the United States to encourage the provision 
of new technologies and services to the public.207  In 1996, Congress reaffirmed this 
policy when it directed the FCC (and state Public Utilities Commissions) to encourage 
the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications 
capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, 
measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other 
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.208  Accordingly, 
the Commission has recently characterized its goal of promot[ing] widespread and rapid 
deployment of high-speed services as one of its prime statutory objectives.209 
 
Similarly, encouraging the rapid deployment of new communications facilities 
was also one of the principle goals of the Communications Act of 1962.210  Indeed, the 
                                                 
207  47 U.S.C. § 157(a). 
208  Telecommunications Act of 1996 §706(a), Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 706(a), 110 
Stat. 56, 153 (1996), codified in notes following 47 U.S.C. §157 (2000).  The 1996 Act 
defines advanced telecommunications capability to mean all high-speed, switched, 
broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive 
high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.  
Id. § 706(c)(1), codified in notes following 47 U.S.C. §157 (2000).  The FCC 
implemented Section 706 in In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 
Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd. 20913 (2000). 
209  In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable 
and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 19287, ¶ 2 (2000); accord id. ¶ 12 
(promising to continue to monitor broadband deployment closely to see whether there 
are developments that could affect our goal of encouraging deployment of broadband 
capabilities pursuant to the requirements of section 706.) (quoting First 706 Report, 14 
FCC Rcd at 2449 ¶ 101). 
210  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (is the policy of the United States to establish, in 
conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable a 
commercial communications satellite system . . . which will serve the communication 
needs of the United States and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace 
(continued . . . ) 
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Satellite Act expressly mandated that [t]he new and expanded [satellite] 
telecommunication services are to be made available as promptly as possible and are to 
be extended to provide global coverage at the earliest practicable date.211    
 
Proponents of  cable open access have asserted that such regulatory unbundling 
requirements would best serve Congresss goal of encouraging rapid deployment of 
facilities.  Specifically, proponents warn that prohibitive entry costs may indefinitely 
hinder new entrants from building last-mile cable connections to homes that would be 
capable of providing end-to-end facilities-based competition against incumbent high-
speed cable ISPs.212  The cost to a potential new entrant of constructing Internet 
backbone and ISP facilities, however, may be less prohibitive than the cost of 
constructing last-mile connections to the home.213  Accordingly, based on their 
prediction that competition in the last mile will not come soon under any regulatory 
regime,214 proponents have asserted that an open access policy would create incentives 
for competitors unequipped to deploy their own last mile facilities to, at least, deploy 
additional backbone and ISP facilities that they would otherwise have no reason to 
                                                                                                                                                 
and understanding.) (emphasis added). 
211  Id. § 701(b) (emphasis added). 
212  Cable open access proponents, for example, have asserted that [s]ince cable 
currently controls over 80% of the high-speed Internet access market, there is effectively 
no significant competition in the broadband Internet access market.  Comments of the 
Open Net Coalition filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 2 (filed Dec. 1, 
2000), available online at <http://www.opennetcoalition.org/resources/NOIfiling.pdf>. 
213  See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Does A Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral 
Intervention?, 26 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 361, 370 (2001) (The facilities-based, 
long-haul telecommunications transmission marketplace has such substantial market 
entry and operational costs that relatively few operators can efficiently and effectively 
enter and remain in the market.  This . . . contrasts with the comparatively low costs and 
low barriers to market entry in reselling the long- haul services of a Tier-1 [facilities-
based] ISP) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
214  See Comments of the Open Net Coalition filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning 
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-
185, at 4 (filed Dec. 1, 2000), available online at 
<http://www.opennetcoalition.org/resources/NOIfiling.pdf> (As a practical matter, only 
two methods of two-way high-speed Internet access . . . are presently available for most 
Internet subscribers in the United Statescable Internet access and DSL.  DSL, however, 
has technical limitations which make it unavailable to many Americans.) (footnote 
omitted). 
 57 
 
deploy.215  Finally, proponents have also asserted that as these unaffiliated backbone and 
ISP providers began to generate business and revenues, they would eventually grow to 
the point where they would find it feasible (and desirable) to build their own competitive 
last-mile facilities. 
 
Similarly, INTELSAT direct access proponents also asserted that regulatory 
unbundling requirements would best encourage rapid deployment of facilities.   Like 
construction of a citywide cable system, construction and launch of a geostationary 
communications satellite can be prohibitively expensive: the cost of constructing and 
launching a single geostationary satellite normally exceeds $500,000,000,216 and a 
substantial proportion of satellite launch attempts either explode on the launching pad or 
                                                 
215  See id. at 2, 19-20 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (asserting that a failure to implement 
cable open access will leave millions of high-speed cable Internet consumers with no 
choice but to accept and pay for ISPs that are owned or affiliated with the cable 
operator, and will thereby frustrate, delay, or simply deny the rapid deployment of 
high-speed cable Internet services). 
It should be noted that there is some controversy regarding whether deployment 
of additional non-last-mile ISP facilities does add value to the Internet.  See 
Technological and Regulatory Factors Affecting Consumer Choice of Internet Providers, 
United States General Accounting Office Report to the Sen. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. 
on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, GAO-01-93, at 30 (Oct. 2000) (The 
experts and industry officials we interviewed differed over whether a reduction in ISP 
choiceif it occursconstitutes a public policy concern.  Some experts felt that . . . a 
reduction of consumer choice at the ISP layer is not a concern as long as there is adequate 
competition among companies providing physical transport to the Internet).  For 
articulations of this view, see. e.g., Rob Frieden, Does A Hierarchical Internet 
Necessitate Multilateral Intervention?, 26 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 361, 369 (2001) 
(In general, a healthy and efficiently operating Internet industry can exist even under a 
hierarchical structure coupled with a limited number of Tier-1 ISPs.) (footnote omitted); 
accord Comments of National Cable Television Association filed In re Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN 
Docket No. 00-185, at 53 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (same); Comments of Cox 
Communications filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 31 (filed Dec. 1, 
2000) (same).  For present purposes, however, this Paper will assume that the FCC would 
conclude that additional deployment of non-last-mile ISP services will yield a marginal 
public benefit. 
216  See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, Hughes, Lockheed Satellite Projects Lack Sponsors, Wall 
St. J., June 4, 2001, at A3, 2001 WL-WSJ 2865370 (projecting a cost between $4.4 
billion and $5.2 billion for construction and launch of eight to twelve proposed 
geostationary satellites).  
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otherwise fail to achieve orbit successfully.217  The cost of constructing new satellite 
earth stations, and new microwave and fiber optic links to connect earth stations with end 
users, however, may not be as prohibitive as the cost of constructing and launching a  
geostationary space station.  Accordinglyand analogously with the deployment-based 
arguments advanced by proponents of cable open accessproponents asserted that 
INTELSAT direct access would expedite the deployment of satellite earth stations and 
terrestrial microwave and fiber optic link facilities, by making it possible for unaffiliated 
carriers to compete against COMSAT for business delivering INTELSAT 
communications services to end users.218  Finally, direct access proponentsagain, like 
cable open access proponentsalso asserted that the revenues generated by unaffiliated 
carriers operating under direct access would eventually make it possible for those carriers 
to launch their own separate geostationary satellite systems. 
 
Opponents of both cable open access and INTELSAT direct access, however,  
have taken issue with the proponents assumption that end-to-end facilities-based 
competition would (or will) never arrive.   Although cable systems have not been 
overbuilt by competing cable systems in very many localities, cable ISPs have begun to 
face intermodal facilities-based competition from competing technologies such as DSL 
that are capable of providing similar high-speed transmission services.219   Similarly, 
INTELSATdespite its history as a protected monopolyhas, in recent years, faced 
facilities-based competition from both competing geostationary satellite systems and 
                                                 
217  See generally House of Representatives Select Committee, Report on U.S. 
National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of 
China, H.R. Rep. No. 105-851, ch. 5-8 (1999), available online at 
<http://www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html> (discussing several satellite launch 
failures). 
218  See Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 16 (1999) 
(citing carrier comments) .  See also id. ¶ 42 (concluding that while direct access . . . 
does not add another facilities-based competitor, the additional choice, flexibility, and 
cost savings made available by direct access to U.S. customers in use of an existing 
facilities-based providerINTELSATwould result in increased competition.).  
Indeed, in the 1980s, some proponents asserted that direct access would yield incentives 
for unaffiliated carriers to invest in INTELSAT itself, thereby enhancing deployment of 
additional INTELSAT satellite facilities.  1982 Direct Access NOI, 90 F.C.C. 2d 1446, 
¶ 8 (1982); see also 1984 Direct Access Order, 97 FCC 2d 296, ¶¶ 14-15 (1984).   An 
analogue to this argument in todays cable open access debate would be an assertion that 
cable open access would encourage unaffiliated ISPs (e.g., EarthLink) to invest in 
facilities-based cable system operators (e.g., AT&T/TCI), and that such investment 
would enable the cable operators to deploy additional last mile facilities.  No such 
argument, however, appears to have been advanced by any cable open access proponent 
to date. 
219  See Part II.B, supra. 
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from competing technologies (e.g., transoceanic submarine cables) capable of providing 
similar international telecommunications transmission services.220  Because end-to-end 
facilities-based competition is economically feasible, opponents assert, regulatory access 
requirements will actually retard deployment of new facilities, by enabling putative 
competitors to obtain market entry without making any risky or expensive investments in 
competing end-to-end facilities.221  Moreover, opponents assert that access requirements 
inhibit the investment necessary to the continued deployment of new technologies and 
rapid deployment of broadband capabilities. . . [by] seriously undermin[ing] the  . . . 
incentives to make such [investments].222   A leading opponent has stated that under a 
cable open access regime: 
 
There would be reduced reasons for cable operators to take the 
substantial risks associated with the deployment of new facilities 
and services if, from the first day,  they were burdened by onerous 
and burdensome government regulation that forced them to make 
the broadband capabilities of their cable plant available to  
competing Internet service providers that have chosen not to take 
those risks.  . . .   The prospect of ill-defined and far-reaching 
regulation would . . . diminish the ability of corporate entities to 
                                                 
220  See Part II.C, supra. 
221  See, e.g., Comments of AT&T filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-
Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
at 40-41 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (By forbearing from imposing open access regulations on 
cable operators, the Commission has fostered an environment that encourages investment 
not only in cable, but also in the alternative broadband technologies, wireless, satellite, 
and DSL) (quoting FCC Cable Services Bureau, Broadband Today, Rep. No. CS 99-14, 
at 49 (Oct. 1999), available online at 
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf>); accord Comments 
of COMSAT Corp. filed In re Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, IB Docket No. 
98-192, at 53 (filed Dec. 23, 1998) (noting that a massive deployment of separate 
international satellite systems and transoceanic submarine cables had all taken place in 
the absence of direct access.  And it is not at all clear how substituting INTELSAT in the 
U.S. for COMSAT will engender more competition. . . .); cf. id. at 61 (asserting that 
direct access would distort the market and discourage deployment of competing facilities 
by causing INTELSAT space segment capacity to be priced below-cost). 
222  Comments of AT&T filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access 
to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 68 (filed 
Dec. 1, 2000); accord id. at 66 (asserting that a cable open access requirement would 
dramatically slow deployment of broadband access, deter investment, stall development 
of new services and technologies, [and] discourage innovative business models. . . .). 
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plan new buildouts, [and also] would effectively kill the public 
equity market for financing.223  
 
The absolute merits of deployment-based arguments for both cable open access 
and INTELSAT direct access are subject to reasonable debate.  In comparative 
perspective, however, the deployment-based case for cable open access  appears 
substantially stronger than the deployment-based case for INTELSAT direct access.  In 
1999, when the FCC adopted a policy of direct access to INTELSAT, INTELSAT 
satellites were already subject to substantial facilities-based competition on every major 
telecommunications route to or from the United States.  During that year, INTELSAT 
owned and operated only 15 of the approximately 75 geosynchronous commercial 
communications satellites that were then capable of serving the United States.224  
Moreover, by 1999, transoceanic submarine fiber optic cables already delivered about 
three times the amount of U.S. international transmission circuits delivered by all satellite 
providersincluding INTELSATcombined.225  Because of this massive deployment of 
competitive facilities during the decade before direct access to INTELSAT was 
mandated, INTELSATs share in the international  telecommunications transmission 
market dropped from nearly 100% in the mid-1980s, to less than half by the late 1990s.226   
Today, even while remaining subject to the unique direct access requirement, the 
recently privatized Intelsat is now estimated to serve only 14% of the market for 
                                                 
223  Id. at 68-69 (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted). 
224  See Phillips Satellite Industry Directory, at 17-234, 279-413 (21st ed. 1999) 
(setting forth complete information about each of these satellites and their operators).  In 
1999, a total of nearly 200 total geosynchronous commercial communications satellites 
were orbiting the earth.  Id.  Of these 200 satellites, INTELSAT owned and operated 19.  
Id.  Four of INTELSATs 19 satellites, however, were incapable of serving the United 
States because they were located above the Indian Ocean.  Id. 
225  See Part II.C, supra.  See also, e.g. In re COMSAT Corp. Reclassification as a 
Non-Dominant Carrier, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶¶ 11, 19, 32-39 (1998) (COMSAT Non-
Dominant Order), modified on recon., 14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999) (characterizing 
satellites and submarine cables as fungible commodities serving the markets for switched 
voice, private line, and video services, and noting that cables compete effectively against 
INTELSAT satellites on every major international telecommunications route to or from 
the United States); id. at 14131 (less than 19,000 satellite circuits carried U.S.-
international traffic, compared to more than 57,000 submarine cable circuits). 
226  See id. at 14121, 14131, 14134-35 (INTELSATs share of international switched 
voice and private line traffic to and from the United States decreased from an average of 
70% in 1988 to less than 21% in 1996; its share of the U.S. international video 
transmission market dropped from 80% in 1994 to less than 45% in 1996).  
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international satellite services,227 which is, itself, only one-third of the overall market for 
international transmission services.228 
 
Like INTELSAT, cable ISPs also face substantial facilities-based competition, at 
least from intermodal competitors.229  But unlike INTELSAT, cable ISPs have not yet 
surrendered the lions share of the their market share to their competitors, facilities-based 
or otherwise.  Rather, as of August 2001, cable modems continued to serve 68% of the 
market for residential high-speed Internet access,230 and their upgraded networks are far 
more ubiquitous than any competing networks.231  Moreover, although other high-speed 
transmission technologies (especially DSL) are currently gaining market share, the FCC 
has nonetheless projected that cable will continue to lead the broadband market until at 
least 2007.232  
 
The theory that a government-mandated access requirement will spurrather 
than hinderdeployment of new facilities can apply only if some structural impediment 
(such as conditions of natural monopoly) is impairing the natural development of end-
                                                 
227  Players Ready For Further Consolidation, INTERSPACE, April 11, 2001, 2001 WL 
10292682.  INTELSATs share in the U.S.-international satellite communications market 
is now third to its intramodal competitors Hughes/PanAmSat Corp. (36 percent) and 
General Electric/GE Americom (29 percent).  Id.   
228  COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. At 14131. 
229  See Part II.B, supra.  See also, e.g., Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 
214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T Corp., 15 FCC Rcd. 9816, at ¶¶ 
116-23 (2000) (AT&T/MediaOne Order)) (declining to impose an open access 
condition because of, inter alia, the increasingly rapid deployment of alternative high-
speed Internet platforms, especially xDSL). 
230  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 9 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002); accord U.S. Department of Commerce, 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, A Nation Online: How 
Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet 35 (Feb. 2002), available online at 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf>. 
231  Comments of SBC Communications Inc. & BellSouth Corp. filed In re Notice of 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
GEN Docket No. 00-185, at ii (filed Dec. 1, 2000); accord id. at 5 & nn.12-13 (citing 
several market share studies). 
232  See FCC Cable Services Bureau, Broadband Today, Rep. No. CS 99-14, at 27 & 
App. B, Chart 2 (Oct. 1999), available online at 
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf>). 
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to-end facilities-based competition.233   As discussed above, both the residential high-
speed Internet transmission market and the international telecommunications 
transmission market seem to be moving inexorably from conditions of de facto monopoly 
to conditions of increasing competition.  However, the international telecommunications 
transmission market (which is now fully competitive) has moved much further down this 
path than has the residential high-speed Internet transmission market (which cable ISPs 
still dominate).  Accordingly, the deployment-based justification for cable open access 
is comparatively stronger than the deployment-based justification for direct access to 
INTELSAT. 
 
B. Encouraging Competition Among Service Providers. 
Whether cable open access or direct access to INTELSAT will enhance or 
diminish competition in their respective markets are questions closely related to the 
issues, discussed in Part VI.A, supra, of whether such mandated access requirements will 
encourage or discourage rapid deployment of competitive facilities.  Increased 
competition, of course, normally brings additional benefits to consumers, beyond merely 
encouraging investment in the deployment of new facilities.  Among the benefits of 
competition that Congress has generally directed the FCC to promote are enhanced 
consumer choice, lower consumer prices, better quality of service, and innovative service 
offerings.234  The debate over whether government-mandated access requirements will 
help achieve such benefits, however, parallels in many respects the debate over whether 
such requirements will help achieve the related goal of encouraging rapid deployment of 
new telecommunications facilities. 
Cable open access proponents, for example, have asserted that since cable 
currently controls a dominant share of the residential high-speed Internet access market, 
there is effectively no significant competition in [that] market.235  Accordingly, these 
                                                 
233  See note [__], supra. 
234  See, e.g., AOL/Time Warner Merger, Mem. Opinion & Order, 23 Comm. Reg. 
(P&F) 157, ¶ 59 & n.169 (Jan. 22, 2001) ([I]n adopting the 1996 Act, Congress 
established a clear national policy to promote the continued development of the Internet 
and to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1)-(2)); see also Comments of the Open Net 
Coalition filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet 
Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 1-2 (filed Dec. 1, 2000), 
available online at <http://www.opennetcoalition.org/resources/NOIfiling.pdf> 
(specifically identifying the benefits of competition as including consumer choice, lower 
prices, better quality of service, and innovative service offerings). 
235  Comments of the Open Net Coalition at 2.  See also Technological and 
Regulatory Factors Affecting Consumer Choice of Internet Providers, United States 
General Accounting Office Report to the Sen. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Antitrust, 
(continued . . . ) 
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proponents assert that a mandatory cable open access requirement would enhance 
consumer choice by ensur[ing] that the next generation of Internet access develops with 
the open architecture and accompanying vibrant competition that has characterized the 
development of a competitive Internet to date.236  On this theory, a failure to implement 
cable open access will leave millions of high-speed cable Internet consumers with no 
choice but to accept and pay for ISPs that are owned or affiliated with the cable 
operator.237  If so, access proponents assert, then cable operators will have a means of 
forcing consumers to pay for additional unwanted services in order to obtain the package 
of high-speed Internet services they desire.238  Alternatively, proponents assert that cable-
affiliated ISPs may also have incentives to restrict consumers access to Internet 
contentespecially streaming videothat threatens their core cable television 
business.239  Finally, proponents assert that without cable open access, cable ISPs will 
extract monopoly rents in the form of excessive rates charged to their residential 
customers.240 
                                                                                                                                                 
Business Rights, and Competition, GAO-01-93, at 44 (Oct. 2000) (GAO Consumer 
Choice Study) ([I]f broadband is a distinct market, cable firms do currently hold a 
leading position in that market.).  
236  Comments of the Open Net Coalition at 19; see also GAO Consumer Choice 
Study, GAO-01-93, at 23-24 (Oct. 2000) (noting that the common carrier status of 
telephone companies, which requires that they provide nondiscriminatory service at just 
and reasonable rates, worked to give [narrowband] ISPs easy access to consumers 
through the telephone network). 
237  Comments of the Open Net Coalition at 19-20. 
238  Id. at 2; see also id. at 6 (Because many ISPs have become content aggregators 
offering varied content and diverse applicationsin addition to basic on-ramp 
capability, preserving choice in the ISP marketplace is key to allowing consumers to 
vote with their feet and switch ISPs if they do not like the content and/or applications of 
the ISP affiliated with their cable modem service provider.) (footnote and citation 
omitted) (quoting GAO Consumer Choice Study, GAO-01-93, at 30 (Oct. 2000)).  Cf. 
Comments of the Competitive Access Coalition filed In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning 
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-
185, at 5 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (characterizing the now-routine bundling of cable high-
speed Internet transmission with affiliated cable ISP service as an anticompetitive tying 
agreement[]). 
239  See id. at 8 (alleging that a cable ISPs recent decision to limit video streaming to 
ten minutes likely resulted from a business decision by cable operators to limit 
competition to the proprietary cable television service also owned by the owners of cable 
modem service, thereby impeding the development of this important new technology by 
limiting its markets.).  
240  See, e.g., Comments of the Competitive Access Coalition filed In re Notice of 
(continued . . . ) 
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Similarly, INTELSAT direct access proponents also asserted that regulatory 
unbundling requirements would best encourage such benefits of competition as enhanced 
consumer choice, lower consumer prices, better quality of service, and innovative service 
offerings.   Specifically, such proponents maintain[ed] that permitting direct access 
[would] promote competition and result in: (1) greater customer choice due to the 
availability of competitive alternatives for accessing INTELSAT (where INTELSAT is 
their system of choice); (2) opportunity for substantial cost savings as a result of 
competition for accessing INTELSAT, resulting in reduced end user prices; (3) greater 
customer control over service provision (involving service quality, performance costs, 
connectivity and redundancy); and (4) efficiencies in system planning and set up of 
circuits.241 
 
As with the deployment-based arguments discussed in Part IV.A, supra, however, 
the question of whether mandated access requirements would yield the desired additional 
competitive benefits turns largely on the question of whether access requirements will 
spur increased competition or, conversely, hinder it.   Seemingly, every identified benefit 
of competition would be maximized by the development of genuine facilities-based 
competition, as opposed to purely retail competition between resellers of transmission 
capacity provided using the same underlying facilities.242  For this reason, mandatory 
unbundling requirements are desirably only in communications markets that enjoy no 
realistic near-term prospect for the development of facilities-based competition, or, 
alternatively, in markets where unbundling requirements would not reasonably be 
expected to create a disincentive to such development.  Conversely, in markets where 
facilities-based competition might be expected to develop, unbundling requirements 
should not be adopted if they would create a disincentive to such development. 
 
Like the deployment-based arguments, the absolute merits of competition-based 
arguments for both cable open access and INTELSAT direct access are subject to 
reasonable debate.  In comparative perspective, however, the competition-based case for 
cable open access again appears substantially stronger than the competition-based case 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 26 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (Any company, in the legitimate 
pursuit of its self-interest, will seek to exploit its control over a scarce resource.  . . . It is 
natural for companies that control access to a connection point between producers and 
consumers to adopt strategies designed to maximize the profit potential of that control.). 
241 See Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 16 (1999) 
(citing Comments filed by direct access proponents). 
242  Under cable open access, unaffiliated ISPs would resell high-speed transmission 
capacity provided by a single monopoly cable system operator.  Under INTELSAT direct 
access, retail international carriers would resell satellite space segment transmission 
capacity provided by INTELSAT. 
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for INTELSAT direct access.  In 1999, when it implemented direct access to 
INTELSAT, the FCC explained the competitive benefits of direct access as follows:  
 
While . . . direct access . . . does not add another facilities-based 
competitor, the additional choice, flexibility, and cost savings 
made available by direct access to U.S. customers in use of an 
existing facilities-based providerINTELSATwould result in 
increased competition.   . . . [D]irect access would place 
competitive pressures on other satellite operators in terms of 
service, price, and quality.  In addition, it would place competitive 
pressures on Comsat, particularly with respect to services for 
which Comsat has a markup substantially higher than INTELSAT 
IUC [wholesale] rates.243 
 
Like direct access to INTELSAT, cable open access would not add another 
facilities-based competitor.   And like direct access to INTELSAT, cable open access 
would make available to U.S. customers the use of facilities that belong to an existing 
facilities-based providerthe incumbent cable operators last mile connectionto 
obtain services from unaffiliated service providers (here, ISPs) that compete against the 
facilities-based providers own affiliate.  In the same way that direct access to 
INTELSAT would place competitive pressures on the affiliate (COMSAT) of the 
facilities-based provider (INTELSAT),  cable open access would place competitive 
pressures on the affiliate (cable ISP) of the facilities-based provider (cable system 
operator).244   In both cases, these competitive pressures: would be particularly acute 
with respect to services for which [the incumbents retail affiliate] has a markup 
substantially higher than its wholesale cost of obtaining transmission capacity from its 
facilities-based affiliated provider.245 
 
There are, however, several competitive differences between direct access to 
INTELSAT and cable open access.  First, while many (perhaps most) customers use their 
ISP only [as] a simple on-ramp to the Internet, an increasing number of customers 
select their ISP based on the individual ISPs content and applications, which may 
include proprietary search engines, content aggregators, or a particular e-mail 
address domain.246  Indeed, the most popular dial-up ISP, America Online, now offers a 
popular bring-your-own-access plan providing unlimited access to thousands of unique 
AOL features . . . for individuals who already have an Internet connection or access 
                                                 
243  Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd 15703, ¶ 42 (1999). 
244  Cf. id. 
245  Id. 
246  GAO Consumer Choice Study, GAO-01-93, at 30 (Oct. 2000). 
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through the work or school environment.247   Because at least some customers are 
willing to pay for AOLs content and applications even while obtaining their basic on-
ramp to the Internet elsewhere, it would appear that competition based on service 
offerings is possible between ISPs who provide identical transmission services.  
 
In the market for INTELSAT international space segment transmission capacity, 
in contrast, such competition is unlikely.  INTELSAT space segment capacity is 
furnished in the form of raw transmission capacity to international common carriers 
(e.g., AT&T, WorldCom, Sprint) and other users (e.g., television networks, ISPs) who 
use the raw capacity as an input, to provide a component of the end-to-end 
telecommunications services that these entities produce.  Accordingly, regardless of 
whether raw INTELSAT capacity is furnished by COMSAT, INTELSAT, or an 
unaffiliated direct access provider, the transmission capacity itself is identical.  While 
INTELSAT satellites are subject to vigorous facilities-based competition based on price, 
availability, and quality of service, competing direct access providers of raw 
INTELSAT capacity have no meaningful way to compete with one another by 
innovating in the nature of their service offerings. 
 
Cable open access is also more likely than INTELSAT direct access to result in 
meaningful price competition at the retail level.   Currently, there are substantial 
variations in price between competing narrowband dial-up ISPs, all of whom normally 
must rely on the same local telephone company to transmit information between their 
own points-of-presence and their subscribers homes.   A number of advertiser-supported 
ISPs currently offer dial-up Internet service cost-free to the user.248  Many no-frills ISPs 
offer unlimited monthly 56K dial-up Internet service for $9.95 per month or less.249  On 
the other hand, AOLs standard plan providing access to AOL and the Internet 
currently retails for $23.90 per month.250  This significant variation in the price charged 
by ISPs for traditional dial-up Internet access indicates that  price competition between 
pure ISPs who do not provide last-mile facilities is possible, and may in fact exert 
downward pressure on ISP prices. 
                                                 
247  AOL Anywhere Pricing Plans Web Page, 
<http://www.aol.com/info/pricing.html>. 
248  See Freedomlist Free ISP Web Page, 
<http://www.freedomlist.com/find.php3?country=166&st=1> (listing 12 U.S.-based ISPs 
that offer dial-up Internet access free of charge to the user). 
249  See Freedomlist Cheap ISP Web Page,  
<http://www.freedomlist.com/find.php3?country=166&st=3>  (listing 124 U.S.-based 
ISPs that offer unlimited monthly 56K dial-up Internet access for less than $10 per 
month). 
250  AOL Anywhere Pricing Plans Web Page, 
<http://www.aol.com/info/pricing.html>. 
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In contrast, the INTELSAT wholesale IUC rate constitutes only an extremely 
minimal component of the retail cost of an international phone call.  Thus, direct access 
to INTELSAT holds far less potential than cable open access to provide cost savings to 
end users.  In 1984, the FCC declined to adopt direct access when, inter alia, it concluded 
that while direct access might help trim the cost to U.S. users of INTELSAT space 
segment, it is doubtful that any savings in this area could exceed a few percentage points 
of the total cost to U.S. users of a communications channel.251  Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, INTELSATs wholesale IUC rate continued to drop, as technological 
advances enabled each new satellite to carry many more simultaneous calls than its 
predecessor.  By 1999, when the FCC implemented direct access, an economic study 
conducted by the Harvard-affiliated Brattle Group estimated that the INTELSAT IUC 
rate constituted only 1.3% of the price of the average international phone call, meaning 
that any consumer savings [from direct access] would amount to only 1.3% of the total 
end user charges, even if INTELSAT services were provided free.252  The same study 
also concluded that even this potential 1.3% savings was highly likely to be appropriated 
by the U.S. and foreign international carriers who initiated and terminated the call, rather 
than passed through to the consumer.253  
 
For these reasons, the competition-based justification for cable open access is 
comparatively stronger than the  competition-based justification for direct access to 
INTELSAT. 
 
C. Maintaining Regulatory Parity Among Technologies That 
Provide the Same (or Fungible) Services. 
Historically, different types of communications facilities have been subject to 
different FCC regulations.254  For much of the twentieth century, the FCCs atomized 
                                                 
251  Regulatory Policies Concerning Direct Access to INTELSAT Space Segment for 
the U.S. International Service Carriers, 97 F.C.C. 2d 296, ¶ 49 (1984) (1984 Direct 
Access Order), affd, Western Union Intl, Inc. v. FCC, 804 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  
See also id. ¶ 67 (We have not been presented with any evidence to show that the 
alleged savings to be realized from these [direct access] proposals, assuming, arguendo, 
that such are passed-through dollar-for-dollar by carriers to end-users, would exceed 
more than a few percentage points of the total end-user charge.). 
252  Comments of COMSAT Corp. filed in Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 
IB Docket No. 98-192, at 73 n.200 (filed Dec. 23, 1998) (emphasis in original). 
253  Id. at 74 & nn.201-02. 
254  See Part III, supra (discussing separate regulatory regimes that were employed to 
regulate cable, telephony, and satellite); see generally Rosemary Harold, Cable-Based 
Internet Access: Exorcising the Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev 721 
(continued . . . ) 
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regulatory approach made sense:  cable television was not the same service as telephony, 
so why should it be subject to the same FCC regulations?255  Indeed, even as 
technological advances began to facilitate the development of intermodal competition in 
telecommunications, the FCC sometimes continued to defend the propriety of certain 
legacy-based regulatory paradigms disparities which effectively imposed wildly disparate 
regulatory obligations on head-to-head competitors.256 
 
 By the mid-1990s, however, the FCC regularly asserted that when competing 
technological platforms are capable of providing fungible services, the public interest is 
normally best served by regulatory neutrality.257  As one commentator explained, [c]alls 
for fundamental equity and fairness of treatment are American maxims; in regulatory 
circles, arguments for leveling the playing field exercise a great pull over time, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2001) (discussing legacy of platform-specific regulation). 
255  Today, the FCCs Rules continue to be organized on a facility-specific basis. See, 
e.g., 47 C.F.R. Part 25 (setting forth rules governing communications satellites); 47 
C.F.R. Parts 42-69 (setting forth rules governing wireline common carriers); 47 C.F.R. 
Part 73 (setting forth rules governing broadcast radio and television); 47 C.F.R. Part 76 
(setting forth rules governing cable TV). 
256  See, e.g., Transfer of Control of McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. to AT&T, 
Order on Recon., 10 FCC Rcd. 11786, ¶ 9 (1995) (asserting that the 1934 
Communications Act requires the FCC to focus on competition that benefits the public 
interest, not on equalizing competition among competitors.   . . . [T]he Communications 
Act does not require parity between competitors as a general principle.) (footnotes and 
citations omitted); see also MCI Telecommunications Corp., 68 F.C.C. 2d 1553, __ & 
n.16 (1978) (Washburn, Commr, concurring) (The touchstone of regulation should be 
rooted in the public's interest, not in some notion of regulatory parity.  This is especially 
true where the [regulated] parties are . . . dissimilarly situated. . . .  It makes little sense to 
fashion the same cage for a canary as for a gorilla.), affd sub nom., Lincoln Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. FCC, 659 F. 2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
257  See, e.g., Waiver of the Commission's Rules Regulating Rates for Cable Services, 
11 FCC Rcd. 1179, ¶ 25 (1995) (noting that the public interest would be served by 
establishing some measure of regulatory parity between the cable operators and [video 
dial tone] programmers who provide similar services); Equal Access and 
Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 9 FCC Rcd. 5408, ¶ 3  (1994) (suggesting 
that the public interest would be served by imposing the same equal access obligations 
on wireless telecommunications licensees as those imposed on wireline licensees, 
because, inter alia, imposition of such obligations would foster regulatory parity 
between wireline and wireless services.), proceeding terminated, 11 FCC Rcd. 12456 
(1996). 
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particularly when the services being regulated differently come to look more and more 
the same to consumers.258  Accordingly, Bush Administration policy now holds that: 
 
where possible, we should promote competition through a 
technology-neutral paradigm.  . . . [B]roadband services can be 
deployed over telephony, cable, wireless and satellite platforms. 
The differing histories and regulations surrounding each type of 
platform makes absolute regulatory parity difficult to achieve, but 
it is important to try to regulate comparable services in a manner 
that does not interfere with marketplace outcomes.259 
 
 Consistent with this policy, the FCC in the March 15, 2002 Cable Modem Order 
& NPRM expressed a desire to create a rational framework for the regulation of 
competing services that are provided via different technologies and network 
architectures.260   Noting that residential high-speed access to the Internet is evolving 
over multiple electronic platforms, including wireline, cable, terrestrial wireless and 
satellite, the Commission stated that it strive[s] to develop an analytical approach that 
is, to the extent possible, consistent across multiple platforms.261 
 
 At present, of course, the FCCs regulations that govern the residential market for 
high-speed Internet access are not consistent across multiple platforms.  Rather, cable 
modem service is currently not subject to any unbundling or open access requirements, 
while cables chief rival (DSL) is subject to such requirements.262   Regulatory parity 
between cable and DSL, of course, could be attained without implementing cable open 
access:  the FCC could reach the same goal by instead choosing to relax the unbundling 
                                                 
258  Rosemary Harold, Cable-Based Internet Access: Exorcising the Ghosts of 
"Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev 721, 728 (2001). 
259  Keynote Address by Asst Secy of Commerce Nancy Victory before the Alliance 
for Public Technology Broadband Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2002), online 
at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/speeches/2002/apt_020802.htm>.  See also, e.g., 
Remarks of FCC Commr Michael K. Powell before the Progress & Freedom Foundation 
(Dec. 8, 2000), online at <http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell> (calling 
rationaliz[ation] of regulations governing residential high-speed Internet access, on 
ground that a bit is a bit, regardless of the transmission system). 
260  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 6 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002). 
261  Id. 
262  See Part IV, supra. 
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requirements that currently apply to DSL service, as it has proposed to do.263  However, 
implementation of cable open access certainly remains one possible vehicle for the 
Commission to adopt a technology-neutral paradigm for regulating residential high-speed 
Internet access that is consistent across multiple platforms.264 
 
 The implementation of direct access to INTELSAT, in contrast, had precisely the 
opposite effect.  Rather than introducing a technology-neutral paradigm into the 
regulation of international telecommunications services, direct access to INTELSAT 
replaced the rough regulatory parity that had already developed in that market with 
unique regulatory disparity.  Specifically, even before direct access was implemented, 
COMSAT already was prohibited from bundling the provision of satellite transmission 
capacity (over which it historically enjoyed market power) with its provision of ancillary 
services that were subject to competition.265  Thus, COMSAT, like other dominant retail 
international common carriers,266 was long required to provide its services to its retail 
customers on an unbundled a la carte basis. 
                                                 
263  See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 02-42, CC Docket No. 02-33, 2002 WL 252714 (rel. Feb. 15, 2002) 
(initiating proceeding to consider whether DSL unbundling requirements should be 
relaxed to attain regulatory parity with cable modem service). 
264  See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶¶ 77-78 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002) (suggesting that implementing cable open 
access would advance the FCCs goal of regulatory parity, and querying whether there is 
any legal or policy reason why cable modem service should not be subject to the same 
unbundling and access requirements to which DSL service is subject). 
265  See, e.g., COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶¶ 169-70 (1998) 
(COMSAT must unbundle its earth station services from its provision of INTELSAT 
space segment transmission capacity); Communications Satellite Corp. Structural Relief 
Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 1531, 1536 (1993) (COMSAT must unbundle its maritime value-
added services from its provision of ship-to-shore transmission capacity); Comsat Corp. 
Petition for Further Partial Waiver of Structural Separation Requirements, 11 FCC Rcd. 
7938, p 29 (1996) (COMSAT must unbundle its provision of mobile terminal equipment, 
related software, and other maritime value-added services from its provision of ship-to-
shore transmission capacity). 
266  See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.10-63.17 (setting forth regulations that govern international 
common carriers).  Cf. Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications 
Regulation, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 819, 827 (2000) (From an antitrust perspective, 
mandates to unbundle facilitieswhether real or virtualserve two purposes: first, to 
prevent the use of market power in one market to disadvantage competition in a second 
market; and second, to facilitate competitive entry into a market where a company's 
entrenched monopoly power would be extraordinarily difficult to overcome.). 
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At the same time, however, until 1999, neither INTELSAT nor any other 
facilities-based satellite or submarine cable operator had been required to sell raw 
international telecommunications transmission capacity to an unaffiliated competitor on 
the same wholesale terms and conditions that it sold such capacity to its own retail 
affiliate.267  Thus, a satellite operator such as Hughes/PanAmSat has never enjoyed any 
right to purchase transoceanic submarine cable transmission capacity at wholesale rates 
from a cable provider such as AT&T.  Similarly, a transoceanic submarine cable operator 
such as AT&T has never enjoyed any right to purchase satellite transmission capacity at 
wholesale rates from a satellite operator such as Hughes/PanAmSat. 
  
Direct access to INTELSAT carves out a unique exception to this general rule, by 
imposing a unique regulatory burden on INTELSAT that applies to none of INTELSATs 
intermodal or intramodal competitors.  Under direct access, INTELSAT is required to 
supply transmission capacity at wholesale rates to unaffiliated satellite operators, 
submarine cable operators, or non-facilities-based resellers.268  None of those 
competitors, however, are burdened by any corresponding obligation to supply 
transmission capacity at wholesale rates to INTELSAT, to COMSAT, or to anyone else. 
 
As discussed above, one can reasonably debate whether implementing cable open 
access would be the most efficacious way for the FCC to advance its goal of a 
technology-neutral regulatory parity.  It is clear, however, that imposing unique direct 
access requirements on INTELSAT that do not apply to any of its facilities-based head-
to-head competitors cannot be said to advance the cause of regulatory parity.  
Accordingly, the parity-based case for cable open access is comparatively stronger than 
the parity-based case for direct access to INTELSAT. 
   
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The FCC is now engaged in resolving whether to require cable system operators 
who provide cable modem service to residential users to furnish cable transmission 
capacity to unaffiliated Internet Service Providers.  To resolve this controversy, the FCC 
has expressed a desire to develop an analytical approach that is, to the extent possible, 
                                                 
267  Until 1991, the FCC actually limited the quantity of international 
telecommunications transmission capacity that a facilities-based provider could supply at 
wholesale rates to retail resellers.  See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An 
Introduction to International Telecommunications Law 107 (1996).  In 1991, however, 
the FCC eliminated such limitations after concluding that unlimited resale opportunities 
would lead to reduced retail prices.  Id. at 107-08 & n.12 (citing 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 
160 (1991)). 
268  See Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd 15703 (1999). 
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consistent across multiple platforms.269  This comment may have been intended to 
specifically highlight the fact that DSL service is currently subject to a panoply of access 
and unbundling requirements that do not now apply to cable modem service.  However, it 
can also be read more broadly to suggest that in a world of increasing technological 
convergence and increasing intermodal competition, a more universally consistent 
analytical approach is needed to resolve the many analogous disputes over competitive 
access to proprietary bottleneck facilities that arise in a broad range of communications 
contexts.   
 
  The issues raised by the current dispute over cable open access are substantially 
analogous to those raised in the longstanding dispute over direct access to the 
INTELSAT satellite system.  That dispute was resolved in 1999, when the FCC authorized 
unaffiliated competitors to obtain direct access to INTELSAT, on the grounds that such a 
policy would :  (1) encourage the widest possible deployment of communications 
facilities; (2) encourage competition among providers of communications service; and (3) 
benefit consumers by facilitating lower prices and more diverse service offerings.  Each 
of these arguments have been raised by proponents of cable open access.  In fact, without 
exception, these criteria each support the implementation of cable open access today at 
least as strongly as they supported the implementation of direct access to INTELSAT in 
1999.  Accordingly, implementation of cable open access would be analytically 
consistent with the implementation of direct access to INTELSAT.  Conversely, an FCC  
decision not to implement cable open access would be analytically inconsistent (indeed, 
irreconcilable) its decision to impose INTELSAT direct access decision. 
 
 
 
                                                 
269  In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, FCC 02-77, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 
2002 WL 407567, ¶ 73 (rel. Mar. 15, 2002), petitions for review pending sub nom., 
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